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PAY FOR REGULATOR PERFORMANCE 
M. Todd Henderson and Frederick Tung* 
 
 
 
Few doubt that executive compensation arrangements en-
couraged the excessive risk taking by banks that led to the recent 
Financial Crisis. Accordingly, academics and lawmakers have 
called for the reform of banker pay practices. In this Article, we 
argue that regulator pay is to blame as well, and that fixing it may 
be easier and more effective than reforming banker pay. Regula-
tory failures during the Financial Crisis resulted at least in part 
from a lack of sufficient incentives for examiners to act aggres-
sively to prevent excessive risk. Bank regulators are rarely paid for 
performance, and in atypical cases involving performance bonus 
programs, the bonuses have been allocated in highly inefficient 
ways. We propose that regulators, specifically bank examiners, be 
compensated with a debt-heavy mix of phantom bank equity and 
debt, as well as a separate bonus linked to the timing of the deci-
sion to take over a bank. Our pay-for-performance approach for 
regulators would help reduce the incidence of future regulatory 
failures.  
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Why did the [regulatory] system fool itself?† 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Conventional wisdom holds that executive compensation 
practices helped precipitate the Great Financial Crisis. As a result, 
pay reform has been a central focus for policymakers and schol-
ars.1 We agree that pay practices likely contributed to the Crisis, 
but the problems were not confined to Wall Street bankers’ pay. 
The pay of Wall Street regulators is to blame as well. Myriad tales 
of regulatory inertia preceding the Crisis strongly suggest that 
regulators simply had insufficient incentive to act aggressively in 
the face of banks’ excessive risk taking. We propose a solution—
performance pay for bank regulators. 
Some note that banker pay may have been too high-
powered—too focused on shareholder value and insufficiently sen-
sitive to potential losses, which would ultimately be borne by tax-
payers.2 We assert that bank regulators’ pay is not high-powered 
enough and therefore, ironically, also insufficiently sensitive to 
potential losses to taxpayers. Currently, regulators’ pay is not in 
any way linked to performance. Bank regulators are civil servants 
paid a fixed salary that does not depend on whether their actions 
improve banks’ performance, protect banks from failure, or in-
                                                
† Ellen Seidman, former head of the Office of Thrift Supervision. 
1 See Dodd-FrankWall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, § 1011(a), 124 Stat. 1376 , 1964 (2010). See also Sanjai Bhagat & 
Roberta Romano, Reforming Executive Compensation: Focusing and Commit-
ting to the Long-Term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (2009); Lucian A. Bebchuk & 
Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L. J. 247 (2010); Patrick 
Bolton, et al., Executive Compensation and Risk Taking, FRB of New York 
Staff Report No. 456 (June 2010); Rudiger Fahlenbrach & Rene M. Stulz, Bank 
CEO Incentives and the Credit Crisis, 1 J. FIN. ECON. __ (2010); Frederick 
Tung, Pay for Banker Performance: Structuring Executive Compensation for 
Risk Regulation, 105 NW. U. L. REV. _ (forthcoming 2011); Frederick Tung and 
Xue Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt Compensation, and the Global Financial 
Crisis, Working Paper (2011). 
2 Taxpayers bear the ultimate responsibility for failed banks, either from ex-
plicit insurance provided by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation or im-
plicit insurance seen in the bailout of Citigroup, Bear Stearns, AIG, and other 
financial institutions. See infra Part III.B.2  
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crease social welfare.3  
In this Article, we show how bureaucratic pay for bank 
regulators can lead to suboptimal regulatory action, and we pro-
pose incentive pay as a solution. Specifically, we propose that in 
addition to salary, bank examiners should receive incentive pay 
based on changes in the value of a debt-heavy portfolio of the debt 
and equity securities of the banks they regulate.4 In addition, 
should a bank have to be taken over, the examiner would receive a 
bonus related to the timing of the takeover decision. Giving exam-
iners a stake in bank performance, both upside and downside, will 
create better incentives to promote optimal regulations, to inter-
vene where necessary to reduce bank risk taking, and to innovate 
to improve regulatory efficiency. If incentives are well calibrated, 
examiners can capture some of the benefits that accrue from mak-
ing banks more valuable, while suffering as well some of the nega-
tive consequences when banks fail. 
For each of the largest banks, one or more permanent ex-
aminers are assigned to supervise the bank as their full-time job. 
They have offices and support staff at the bank, and they spend a 
good part of their working lives as a regular presence at the bank 
they supervise. This permanent examiner and the large bank she 
supervises are our focus.5 The idea of incentive pay could be gen-
                                                
3 See Part ___, infra. 
4 As described below, see infra note __, we propose that examiners be paid 
with “phantom” securities—cash payments based on the market performance of 
their regulated banks’ stock and debt securities—instead of actual securities of 
their banks. This approach avoids potential insider trading issues and the specter 
of government control of banks. The equity securities we rely on are the publicly 
traded equity securities of the bank holding company parent of the bank. Almost 
every large bank is held as a wholly owned subsidiary of a bank holding com-
pany. See infra Part V.B.3. 
5 Insofar as authority to supervise, control bank conduct, and impose regula-
tory sanctions rests elsewhere, either as a matter of course or for a particular 
bank, then incentives should be placed there as well. We discuss this in the con-
text of the bank shutdown decision. See infra Part V.C. Where there is more 
than one senior-level examiner, it might make sense to have incentive compen-
sation for each examiner above a certain level, just as many high-tech firms 
award stock options widely among employees, or it might be more sensible to 
have only one examiner so compensated. In general, we leave it to agency heads 
to decide the overall scope for the implementation of performance pay. See infra 
Part ˛III.A. 
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eralized to higher-level bank regulators (and incentive pay may be 
needed there as well).6 For logistical reasons,7 however, our spe-
cific proposal centers on bank examiners. Given the novelty of our 
proposal, we are content to advocate primarily for focused experi-
mentation with bank examiners. More powerfully incentivized 
bank examiners may also reduce the need for market-based incen-
tives at higher levels. Incentivized bank examiners could be ex-
pected to push more aggressively against a suboptimal status quo 
than examiners not so incentivized.8 
Our proposal offers a partial remedy for some widely rec-
ognized infirmities that routinely plague the administration of 
regulatory systems. These include capture, indifference or slack, a 
lack of creativity or innovation, a selection bias in who takes gov-
ernment jobs, and a mismatch between skills and regulatory as-
signments. We believe incentives for regulators could go a long 
way toward improving regulatory efficiency without upsetting too 
much the current civil service system or the culture of public serv-
ice at bank regulatory agencies. 
In the absence of high-powered incentives, it is assumed 
that those individuals who self-select into regulatory jobs will 
value public service, and will do the work of aligning performance 
with desired social welfare outcomes. But this proxy is obviously 
not perfect: some will choose government jobs because the job 
demands may be less severe than in the private sector; some may 
value public service but not in ways consistent with social welfare 
                                                
6 See infra Part VI.F (discussing the possible application of our proposal to 
higher-level regulators). 
7 The major logistical hurdle for applying our proposal to higher-level regu-
lators is that unlike permanent examiners, these regulators typically oversee 
multiple banks. Holding a portfolio of debt and equity securities of multiple 
banks may create perverse incentives for the regulator. For example, she may be 
tempted to favor the most promising bank over others, instead of minding the 
safety and soundness of each bank. See id. 
8 Our focus on examiners also requires that we limit the scope of our pro-
posal to the period before and including the decision to shut down a bank. Ad-
mittedly, important decisions are made after the shutdown decision that affect 
bank creditor recoveries and the amount of losses left with taxpayers. Because 
banks’ securities are typically worthless once banks fail, however, and because 
examiners play little or no role in the conduct of the receiverships that resolve 
failed banks’ assets and liabilities, our proposal’s scope is necessarily limited to 
the period before and including shutdown.  
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maximizing regulation; and some who would be great regulators 
may be put off by the lack of incentives and absolute levels of pay. 
There is undoubtedly some variation across regulators. Given this 
and the seniority-based system of low-powered incentives, even 
those regulators with the best motives and skills would not neces-
sarily rise to the top. This approach may not be the optimal way to 
motivate regulators, and, in fact, we present strong evidence that it 
is suboptimal. 
We do not dismiss the value of attracting regulators imbued 
with a desire for public service. We are mindful of the risk that fi-
nancial incentives might crowd out regulators’ public-spirited mo-
tivations toward conscientious regulation: Putting a price on dili-
gence might encourage some regulators to slack.9 At the same 
time, however, regulators’ dismal performance in the Crisis makes 
us skeptical that public-spirited motivations are sufficient incen-
tive. At scores of banks, examiners and other regulators were well 
aware of operational deficiencies and excessive risk taking several 
years before those banks failed.10 But regulators stood still in the 
face of this information. They utterly failed to demand corrective 
action by banks. Instead, examiners continued to rate these risky 
institutions as “fundamentally sound.” Washington Mutual, the 
largest bank failure in U.S. history at the time of its failure, en-
joyed a “fundamentally sound” rating until six days before its col-
lapse.11 Defending regulators’ existing incentive structure seems 
quite problematic after the Crisis.12 
We propose to improve regulators’ incentives by adding or 
subtracting pay based on an algorithm designed to better track the 
social welfare interest in bank regulation. By paying regulators 
with a mix of securities reflecting the full range of a bank’s bal-
ance sheet, our proposal incentivizes regulators toward striking a 
                                                
9 See infra Part VI.A.1. 
10 In the three years before Washington Mutual Bank failed, examiners 
spent over 100,000 hours over 400 days inspecting its assets and operations. See 
infra note 73 and accompanying text. 
11 See infra note Error! Bookmark not defined. and accompanying text. 
12 Moreover, changing the financial incentive structure is also likely to af-
fect the composition of banking regulatory agencies over time. Performance-
based pay may attract candidates different from those who currently self-select 
into banking regulation under existing compensation schemes with low-powered 
incentives. See infra Part VI.A.1. 
2011] PAY FOR REGULATOR PERFORMANCE 5 
DRAFT DECEMBER 2, 2011 
socially optimal balance between increasing bank values and credit 
and reducing the costs of bank failure.  
This could mean more or less regulation, depending on the 
bank and the circumstances. For instance, examiners who gain 
from increases in bank values (by having pay tied to bank equity 
values) may take steps to make the examination process more effi-
cient, to get the amount and type of disclosures right, and to en-
courage valuable lending and risk taking.13 Examiners who lose 
from decreases in the value of bank debt may pursue a more inter-
ventionist approach in some cases, since they bear some of the 
losses arising from the socially inefficient risk that exists on their 
watch. Regulators incentivized to worry about losses to taxpayers 
may be more diligent in their supervision of bank assets and man-
agement, may be more aggressive in assuring that corrective rec-
ommendations are implemented, may encourage or require 
changes to bank balance sheets, and so on. The mix of debt and 
equity securities (or phantom securities) will be key to achieving 
the appropriate types and levels of examiner activity. 
An added benefit is that the market will be fooled less often 
because examiners will have incentive to act promptly when signs 
of trouble arise. Examiners will marshal the private information 
they learn on the job to improve regulation and their own compen-
sation, and examiners’ actions will be reflected in the securities 
markets, albeit indirectly and over time.  
Pay reforms to date have focused on the regulated, not the 
regulators. The so-called pay czar, Kenneth Feinberg, enjoyed 
wide authority to dictate pay at banks receiving emergency funding 
under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).14 The Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) 
adopted several reform proposals targeting banker pay. For exam-
ple, “say on pay” provisions require banks (along with other public 
companies) to conduct regular advisory shareholder votes on ex-
ecutive pay.15  
                                                
13 The debt component of this incentive pay helps to ensure that risk taking 
internalizes the expected social costs of insurance. 
14 Aaron Lucchetti, David Enrich & Joann S. Lublin, Fed Hits Banks with 
Sweeping Pay Limits, WALL ST. J. A1 (Oct. 23, 2009). 
15 See Dodd-Frank, supra note 1, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1011(a), 124 Stat. 
1376 , 1964 (2010). In addition, banks must disclose incentive-based compensa-
(continued next page) 
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Academics have proposed other approaches as well. For in-
stance, Lucian Bebchuk and Holger Spamann argue that bankers 
should be paid not just with equity but with a slice of the entire 
capital structure of their bank holding company in order to better 
internalize the actual costs of corporate decisions on various 
stakeholders.16 One of us has argued elsewhere that a better ap-
proach would be to pay bankers with subordinated debt of their 
banks.17 These academic proposals intend to link banker pay more 
closely with the social welfare outcomes expected from banking 
activity levels and risks. 
Our approach has a similar goal, though regulators would 
have a greater focus on avoiding losses under our approach than 
CEOs would have under these academic proposals. The reason is 
straightforward: CEOs should be focused mostly on creating indi-
vidual firm value, while regulators should be mostly focused on 
minimizing risk. In other words, CEOs have control of the accel-
erator, while regulators man the brake. While the optimal pay 
package for CEOs should contain a bit of brake, as we explain be-
low, the optimal pay package for regulators should include a bit of 
accelerator. Moreover, a well-structured incentive pay arrangement 
for regulators would respond to the structure of bank CEO incen-
tives, since regulators must lean against the risk-inducing features 
of bank CEO pay. Finally, though the reform of regulator pay and 
bank CEO pay are not mutually exclusive, our proposed regulator 
pay reform offers potentially significant advantages over proposed 
banker pay reforms, including relative ease of implementation.18  
We do not view our project as a search for perfect regula-
tory incentives. Instead, we believe that incorporating incentive-
based pay as one component of regulators’ compensation works an 
improvement over current practice. The key is finding metrics for 
                                                                                                         
tion tied to financial outcomes and must adopt a three-year claw-back policy in 
the event of a subsequent financial restatement that suggests incentive payments 
should not have been made. Id. at _. The policy must require return of incentive 
payments that would not have been awarded under the restated financial state-
ments. The penalty for noncompliance is delisting. Interestingly, only the regu-
lated parties suffer the claw-back possibility; regulators, who also received bo-
nuses during the inflation of the housing and finance bubble, get to keep theirs. 
16 See Bebchuk & Spamann, supra note 1 at 1. 
17 See Tung, supra note 1. 
18 See infra Part VI.C. 
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measuring “good” and “bad” performance in government, and de-
ploying them in ways that will not make things worse. Fortunately, 
as we show below, reasonable metrics exist in banking regulation, 
making this a good test case for a more general commitment to pay 
for regulatory performance. As has been the case with executive 
pay, we fully expect there will be learning over time as the inevita-
ble problem arises with our proposal. But much has already been 
learned from the trials and errors in designing executive compensa-
tion, so that implementation of our proposal would hopefully avoid 
some obvious pitfalls of incentive compensation.  
While we leave it to agency heads to develop optimal com-
pensation practices over time, we believe even small steps in the 
direction of our proposal could have large effects on the efficiency 
of banking regulation. The need to incentivize regulators is espe-
cially important after Dodd-Frank, whose say-on-pay provision is 
likely to generate even higher-powered incentives for managers to 
maximize shareholders’ private interests. High-powered bank CEO 
incentives require a corresponding impetus for regulators to proac-
tively constrain bank risk taking.19  
To make our case, we proceed as follows. Part II offers 
background and context for our incentive pay proposal for regula-
tors. In Part III, we describe the current incentive model for bank-
ing regulators, its failure in the Financial Crisis, and theoretical 
criticisms of this model. In Part IV, we elaborate the theoretical 
case for paying banking regulators according to their performance. 
We also define what good and bad performance looks like, tying 
these to objective metrics that can be used to design pay systems. 
Part V then describes in more detail what exactly a pay-for-
performance contract might look like for a bank examiner, includ-
ing a discussion of the mix of consideration types that could be 
used. In Part VI, we offer some qualifications and address some 
limitations to our proposal. Part VII concludes. 
                                                
19 See Sharon Hannes, Compensating for Executive Compensation: The 
Case for Gatekeeper Incentive Pay, 98 CAL. L. REV. 385 (2010) (proposing eq-
uity-based incentive pay for auditors in order to counteract the effect of high-
powered equity incentives for executives that encourage securities fraud and 
financial misreporting).   
8 HENDERSON AND TUNG   
DRAFT DECEMBER 2, 2011 
 
II. REGULATORS’ PAY AND ITS DISCONTENTS 
This Part sets the context for our reform proposal. It re-
counts early discussion of the possibility of incentive pay for gov-
ernment officials, as well as recent innovations in regulator pay. 
 
A. A Short History of Performance Pay 
for Regulators 
We are not the first to point out the problems with the stan-
dard pay structure for bureaucrats. Four decades ago, Gary Becker 
and George Stigler published their seminal article arguing for in-
centive pay for the enforcement of laws.20 Others extended the ar-
gument, developing various economic models demonstrating the 
potential efficiency gains from introducing market-based incen-
tives in the compensation of government officials.21 Susan Rose-
Ackerman authored an important contribution in support of this 
idea, noting that regulators need to be both competent and moti-
vated. She pointed out how economic incentives could do impor-
tant work in providing motivation. Importantly, she explored the 
delicate tradeoffs implicated by the deployment of market-based 
incentives in bureaucratic environments.22  
Unfortunately, these academic insights have found no pur-
chase among policymakers: forty years later, bureaucrats are still 
paid like bureaucrats. The timing of these articles (roughly 1974 to 
1986) was probably inauspicious: during this period, CEOs were 
                                                
20 Gary Becker & George Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and 
Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1974). 
21 See, e.g., Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Some Results on Incentive Con-
tracts with Applications to Education and Employment, Health Insurance, and 
Law Enforcement, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 20 (1978). A related question is whether 
and how best to hold public actors, like the police, school officials, and other 
bureaucrats liable for constitutional violations. After all, holding someone liable 
ex post for bad conduct is similar to adjusting their pay ex ante to pay only for 
good conduct. For a comparison between the public and private approaches to 
this problem, see M. Todd Henderson, Qualified Immunity for Corporate Direc-
tors, Working Paper on file with author. 
22See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Reforming Public Bureaucracy through Eco-
nomic Incentives?, 2 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 131 (1986). 
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paid like bureaucrats too! It was not until four years after Rose-
Ackerman’s proposal that Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy pub-
lished their path-breaking article in the Harvard Business Review 
arguing for incentive pay for CEOs.23 Summarizing pay practices 
of publicly traded companies at the time, they concluded that “cor-
porate America pays its most important leaders like bureaucrats,” 
instead of owners. They advocated for a dramatic increase in the 
use of stock option compensation.24 Unlike the academic proposals 
on incentivizing government actors, the Jensen and Murphy article 
triggered a decades-long process of fundamental change in the 
structure of executive pay. Although some gripe at imperfections 
in current executive compensation practices,25 no one doubts that 
CEOs now have greater incentives to act in the interests of share-
holders than they did before the advent of incentive compensation.  
We propose to apply that learning to the regulatory context 
to improve regulator performance. Giving the regulator a medium- 
to long-term stake in the value of the regulated entity may encour-
age regulatory decisions that improve social welfare. The key is to 
ensure that regulator pay properly accounts for the social compo-
nent of banking risk. The banker pay reforms discussed above have 
traction because they include a social welfare component in banker 
pay. These lessons can be applied to regulator pay as well. 
 
B. Toward Regulator Pay for Performance 
Our regulatory incentive compensation proposal borrows 
not only from the neglected economics literature of the past. It also 
finds hope in changed pay practices for government officials im-
plemented in the last few years. The Obama administration has 
dramatically increased regulators’ salaries. According to public 
                                                
23 See Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives—It’s Not 
How Much You Pay, But How, HARV. BUS. REV. (May/June 1990). 
24 Id. 
25 To be sure, there are problems with current pay practices in the private 
sector, but the consensus view is that the linkage between pay and performance 
has been a hugely valuable change for social welfare. Even the strongest critics 
object to the implementation rather than the theory. See, e.g., LUCIAN A. 
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED 
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION (2004). 
 
10 HENDERSON AND TUNG   
DRAFT DECEMBER 2, 2011 
records, the number of federal government officials earning six-
figure salaries has skyrocketed. In the Department of Transporta-
tion, for example, only one DOT employee earned a salary exceed-
ing $170,000 at the start of the recession. Eighteen months later, 
that number had ballooned to 1,690 employees. The number of ci-
vilian employees in the Defense Department earning $150,000 or 
more jumped from 1,868 in December 2007 to 10,100 in the suc-
ceeding eighteen months.26  
A plausible impetus for this trend is the belief that greater 
pay will bring better talent. Here, the federal government is simply 
following the model that other governments have used. Most fa-
mously, Singapore has used large pay increases to improve the 
quality of its regulators.27 While such pay increases may be impor-
tant in attracting talented people, paying more does not necessarily 
generate optimal incentives.28 If it did, the problem of CEO pay 
identified by Jensen and Murphy would not have existed. CEOs 
were highly paid in 1990; they were just not paid for doing the 
things their principals would want them to do. 
Bank regulatory agencies have begun using bonuses osten-
sibly tied to performance. During the period 2003 to 2006, three 
bank regulators – the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC), Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) and the Office of the 
Comptroller of Currency (OCC) – paid out nearly $20 million in 
retention and performance bonuses to bank examiners and other 
regulators.29 In 2006 alone, the FDIC gave bonuses to 2000 bank 
examiners.30 
                                                
26 See http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-12-10-federal-pay-
salaries_N.htm. 
27 Top ministers paid $1.3 million in 2007. Paid 2/3 of median of top 8 pro-
fessionals in several top fields. See 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/09/world/asia/09iht-sing.3.5200498.html. 
28 Higher salaries may improve performance insofar as dismissal becomes 
more costly for employees. See Becker & Stigler, supra note 20, at 6. The job 
protection afforded by civil service rules, however, diminish the risk of dis-
missal considerably. See infra note xx. 
29 See Matt Apuzzo, “Government Bank Regulators Got Big Bonuses,” AS-
SOC. PRESS, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/18/government-bank-regulator-
bonus_n_503712.html. 
30 Id. 
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This very modest move toward pay for regulator perform-
ance, while perhaps a step in the right direction, has several short-
comings. First, although $20 million seems like a lot of money, 
across three years, three agencies, and thousands of regulators, 
most of the bonuses were likely quite small and unlikely to provide 
much incentive to dramatically change behavior.31 Second, the use 
of ex post bonuses may not yield incentives as high-powered as 
with other techniques, such as the mix of equity, debt, and bonuses 
that we propose. At the time Jensen and Murphy wrote, CEOs rou-
tinely received cash bonuses, and yet pay and performance were 
not as tightly linked as when stock and stock options came into 
use. Ex post bonuses do not generate as much accountability as ex 
ante incentive contracts tied to outside metrics. To the extent that 
ex post bonus payments are discretionary, they allow for the intru-
sion of non-performance based criteria, such as favoritism, politi-
cal affiliation, racial or gender bias, and so on. The linkage be-
tween bonuses and conduct that maximizes social welfare may 
therefore be tenuous.32 To be sure, there is a tradeoff between ac-
countability and the ex ante costs of designing and implementing 
transparent incentive structures. As explained below, however, 
banking regulation may be an area where the objective elements of 
good and bad performance make the ex ante design costs small 
relative to the potential efficiency gains. Finally, ex post bonuses 
are likely to be one sided–that is, paid in good times but not re-
                                                
31 Exact individual figures are not available. Although one examiner was 
reported to have received a bonus of about $40,000 on a salary of about 
$180,000, the large number of recipients means the average bonus per year was 
likely more on the order of a few thousand dollars. See id. 
32 A recent audit of the SEC by the OIG shows the general nature of the 
problem. See “Audit of SEC’s Employee Recognition Program and Recruitment, 
Relocation, and Retention Incentives,” Office of Inspector General, Office of 
Audits, Aug. 2, 2001, available at http://www.sec-
oig.gov/Reports/AuditsInspections/2011/492.pdf. The report details numerous 
flaws in the agency’s current compensation practices. For instance, the SEC paid 
a bonus to an employee who “who played a key role in the investigation that 
failed to uncover Bernard Madoff’s massive long-running Ponzi scheme.” See 
BNA, “OIG Audit Spurs Changes to Plan For Employee Recognition, Recruit-
ment,” [cite needed]. 
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couped in bad times. This is likely to bias regulation in a particular 
direction.33 
In the next Part, we consider how these pay practices and a 
lack of high-powered incentives for regulators may have contrib-
uted to regulatory failure in the Financial Crisis. 
                                                
33 Claw-back rules for regulators similar to the Dodd-Frank provision would 
be one way of reducing this bias. 
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III. REGULATORS’ PAY AND THE GREAT FINANCIAL CRISIS 
There is widespread agreement that regulators failed to act 
aggressively enough during the Financial Crisis. As detailed be-
low, the problem was not one primarily of access to information, 
lack of expertise, or resource constraints. Reports on bank failures 
by various inspectors general reach the same conclusion: regulators 
did a satisfactory job of identifying problems well in advance of 
failure, but failed to act aggressively enough to remedy the indenti-
fied problems.34 The problem, in our view, was incentives. Regula-
tors did not have the right incentives to turn their recommendations 
into actual reforms of bank policies. 
Bank examiners are paid a fixed salary and have very stable 
employment. Although their mission is to avoid losses to the fed-
eral deposit insurance fund, they are not paid based on this metric. 
In addition, with pay delinked from an objective performance met-
ric, regulators may naturally focus on bureaucratic tasks with ob-
servable outcomes, rather than on more aggressive and costly ac-
tions with more complex and less transparent cause and effect rela-
tionships. If a bank fails, there are multiple causes to which blame 
can be assigned. But there is only the examiner to blame if reports 
are not accurately completed and done well. Under existing incen-
tives, examiners might naturally conclude that their job is well 
done simply by accurately describing problems and bringing them 
to the attention of management and senior regulators. They have 
no stake in doing more. Doing less, by contrast, means less work, 
                                                
34 See, e.g., Report of the Office of Inspector General, Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, March 2009, “Material Loss Review of Silver State 
Bank, Henderson, Nevada,” (“Silver State Report”) (“[A]lthough the FDIC iden-
tified SSB’s loan concentrations and funding sources as potential high-risk areas 
of concern in examinations completed as early as 2005, the FDIC took limited 
actions to mitigate the bank’s aggregate level of risk exposure.”). The same phe-
nomenon occurred during the S&L Crisis of the 1980s. See FDIC Report, “An 
Examination of the Banking Crises of the 1980s and Early 1990s,” (“FDIC Re-
port”) available at www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/history/421_476.pdf at 24 
(“[T]he analysis in this chapter shows that for most failed banks that had had 
recent examinations, ratings generally did a satisfactory job of identification 
well in advance of failure.”). 
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less hassle, less political pushback, and less risk, all for the same 
wage and career results. 
To see how this problem manifest during the Financial Cri-
sis and how pay for performance might have solved some of the 
problems, we describe what bank regulators do and what they did 
wrong during the Financial Crisis. 
 
A. What Bank Regulators Do 
This section offers a thumbnail sketch of the basics of day-
to-day bank regulation, since the individuals doing this work – 
bank examiners – are the focus of our proposed compensation re-
forms. 
 
1. The Bank Examination Process 
 Several federal agencies supervise banks: the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) supervises national banks; the 
Federal Reserve (Fed) supervises state member banks and bank 
holding companies, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Company 
(FDIC) supervises state non-member banks and FDIC-insured sav-
ings banks.35 Although the rules, regulations, and approaches of 
the various agencies differ, the basic approach is relatively uni-
form. Regulators assess the safety and soundness of banks through 
annual examinations of bank assets and operations. A senior bank 
examiner (the “examiner in charge” or “EIC”) leads an examina-
tion team, which varies in size and composition based on the size 
and complexity of the regulated bank.36 Importantly, the senior 
                                                
35 See FDIC Report, supra note 35 at 463. The FDIC also has back-up su-
pervisory responsibility for monitoring the condition of national banks and state 
member banks. In fulfilling these responsibilities, it works with the other two 
federal regulatory agencies. Under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, 
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), it also has back-up authority to exam-
ine thrift institutions as well. State banking departments supervise state-
chartered banks. Id.  
 36 The resources can be quite extensive. For example, the equivalent of 20 
full-time employees were involved in the supervision of WaMu. See also FDIC 
Report, supra note 35 at 464. 
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bank examiner leading the team is delegated tremendous authority 
over the examination and the regulated bank.37 
 There are several levels of hierarchy in the typical bank 
regulatory agency. At the OCC, for example, EICs for large banks 
are overseen by Deputy Controllers for Large Bank Supervision 
(DLCBS). A DCLBS “[e]valuates and approves the EIC’s recom-
mendations, including regulatory ratings and risk assessments”  
and “[a]pproves the supervisory strategy for each bank.”38 
The examination process has two broad goals: review of 
the quality of bank assets, with special focus on the bank’s most 
important assets, its loans; and analysis of the bank’s financial 
condition and the quality of its management and operations.39 The 
examination typically occurs once per year.40 The process lasts 
from weeks to months, depending on the size and complexity of 
                                                
37 Bank examiners responsible: “This examiner has full responsibility for 
supervision of the entire examination process.” Id. at 463. 
38 Id at 10-11. DCLBSs are part of the OCC Supervisory Office, which 
comprises higher-level regulators that oversee EICs. The Assistant Deputy 
Comptroller at OCC oversees the supervision of a portfolio of small or medium-
sized banks. The ADC has authority to “ensur[e] that the banks address supervi-
sory concerns, follow plans for corrective action, meet reporting requirements, 
and respond properly to enforcement actions.” See Comptroller of the Currency, 
“Bank Supervision Process: Comptroller’s Handbook,” (Sept. 2007) at 9-10. 
Although this seems like the locus of supervisory power for bank examinations, 
it may not be the case. As described in the text, line examiners have significant 
discretion in evaluating credit and management, and there is little an ADC can 
do if the examiner’s judgments in her analysis and reports do not reflect the ac-
tual risk at the bank. 
39 FDIC Report, supra note 35 at 464. 
40 The frequency of examination varies by agency and over time. For in-
stance, the National Bank Act of 1864 mandated that the OCC examine all na-
tional banks twice a year but allowed an extension to three examinations every 
two years. This policy stood until 1974, when the OCC moved toward off-site 
examinations using statistical methods, and the average examination schedule 
was more like 18 months. With the passage of the FDICIA, on-site examinations 
were required by law. By the late 1980s, resident examiners were placed in the 
largest multinational banks, and by the 1990s, larger regional banks also got 
resident examiners. See FDIC report. Similar changes were also true of FDIC 
and Treasury examinations. FDIC examination periods varied from one to three 
years, depending on the CAMELS rating of the bank in question. Like for the 
OCC, however, the FDICIA mandated “annual on-site examinations of all banks 
except highly rated small institutions, for which the interval could be extended 
to 18 months.” FDIC Report at __. 
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the bank, its assets, and operations. The supervision of Washington 
Mutual (WaMu), one of the larger supervised banks under the Of-
fice of Thrift Supervision (OTS), included annual examinations 
from 2003 to 2008 averaging about 200 days. Reported hourly 
work data show that the equivalent of 20 full-time examiners or 
assistants of various kinds was devoted to supervising this one 
bank.41 
Throughout the multistage examination process,42 the lead 
bank examiner has wide discretion as to the volume of loans re-
viewed, the nature of the examination, the time spent on each 
analysis, and the consequences of the examination results. Exam-
iners make local judgments about the credit quality of each asset. 
After discussion with loan officers and bank managers, examiners 
make final determinations (effectively unreviewable) about how to 
classify particular loans for input into a final supervisory rating.43 
Examiners also review loan portfolios as a whole for issues such as 
concentration risk, violations of legal rules, and deviations from 
bank loan and underwriting policies. They assess the behavior and 
impact of subsidiaries and affiliates, risks from litigation, the costs 
and benefits of off-balance-sheet activities, and the activities of 
insiders. 
 Once the on-site review is done, the examiner presents the 
findings to bank management, who are given opportunities to make 
comments, dispute findings, and commit to remedying any defi-
ciencies. Finally, the report is taken to the board of directors, out-
side of the presence of management. Directors are given a chance 
to express their views individually and as a group. To the extent 
problems have been identified, examiners typically seek commit-
ments from individuals or the entire board to take corrective ac-
tions.  
                                                
41 See Dept. of Treasury, Offices of Inspector General, “Evaluation of Fed-
eral Regulatory Oversight of Washington Mutual Bank,” Report No. EVAL-10-
002, Apr. 2010 (“WaMu Report”). 
42 There are four stages of a typical examination: (1) off-site analysis; (2) 
on-site examination; (3) preparation and approval of an official report; and (4) 
use of informal or formal administrative actions designed to solve any problems 
or reduce losses to the insurance system. FDIC Report, supra note 35  at 463. 
43 The examiner will either “pass” a credit or assign it to one of the follow-
ing categories: (1) special mention, (2) substandard, (3) doubtful, or (4) loss. See 
id. 
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 Based on this process, examiners determine the bank’s 
CAMELS rating, which is the single metric used by regulators to 
capture safety and soundness. Examiners rate banks on a scale of 1 
(good) to 5 (bad) in each of six areas – Capital adequacy, Asset 
quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to mar-
ket risk – and then assign a composite score.44 A score of 1 means 
a bank is performing far above average; 2, the most common score, 
means “fundamentally sound”; 3 means “some degree of supervi-
sory concern”; 4 means generally unsafe and unsound conditions; 
and 5 means severe problems and likely failure within one year.45 
On-site review is meant to “identify the risk of failure in 
troubled institutions in sufficient time for supervisors to take cor-
rective action.”46 Another important tool available to examiners is 
a follow-up enforcement action, which is designed to “control the 
risk-taking behavior of problem banks after they have been identi-
fied.”47 This may be necessary because once the bank finds itself in 
peril, managers and shareholders have less to lose from high-risk 
strategies. They have incentives to engage in speculative lending or 
other high-risk strategies, which reward shareholders if successful, 
but place losses primarily with creditors or the government if un-
successful.48 Follow-up enforcement therefore offers a sensible 
regulatory tool.  
 
2. Regulators’ Power over Banks 
Regulators have tremendous power to influence bank deci-
sion making. Much of the actual power resides with bank examin-
ers in their conduct of bank examinations. Moreover, the decision 
to drop a bank’s CAMELS rating from 2 to 3 (moving the bank 
from “fundamentally sound” to indicating “some degree of super-
visory concern”) is largely if not entirely within the discretion of 
the bank examiner. The examiner accompanies this downgrade 
                                                
44 All scores are reported, so a typical rating would look like this: 22122/2. 
See id. 
45 See OTS Examination Handbook, Section 070, pages 070A.3 & .4. 
46 FDIC Report, supra note 35 at 439. 
47 WaMu Report, supra note 43 at __. 
48 FDIC Report, supra note 35 at 439. This of course is the classic asset 
substitution problem for creditors. 
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with informal actions, which include obtaining the bank’s written 
commitment to take corrective action.49 Only when the bank has 
deteriorated significantly—say to a CAMELS rating of 4 or 5—do 
regulatory higher-ups get involved in meetings with the board of 
directors. To get a sense of how rare this might be, WaMu kept its 
overall CAMELS rating of 2 until September 19, 2008; it failed six 
days later.50 
The involvement of higher-level regulators typically in-
cludes the taking of formal legal actions that are enforceable in the 
courts.51 Although ultimate authority to enforce legal sanctions and 
modifications to bank activity resides at administrative levels 
above the bank examiner, even in that situation, examiners wield 
enormous influence because they control the inputs into this deci-
sion making process. Since increased monitoring or regulatory in-
tervention requires examiners to identify problems and pursue ini-
tial ratings downgrades, effective incentives for examiners to act 
are necessary for optimal regulation. Examiner passivity, by con-
trast, effectively insulates a troubled bank from higher-level scru-
tiny and corrective sanctions.  
                                                
49 This written commitment commonly comes in the form of a board resolu-
tion creating a Memorandum of Understanding between the bank and the regula-
tor.  See FDIC Report, supra note 35 at ___. 
50 See WaMu Report, supra note 43  at 18; Robin Sidel, et al., “WaMu is 
Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, In Largest Failure in U.S. Banking History, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, available at 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122238415586576687.html.  
51 See id. at 441. These include mandatory asset sales, sales of new equity or 
debt, cease-and-desist orders, suspension or removal of officers and directors, 
and civil penalties. Id at 441-42. Section 8 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
is exemplary of the powers given to bank examiners in this area. It gives the 
FDIC board broad formal enforcement powers to terminate FDIC insurance pro-
tection; (8(a)) to issue cease and desist orders; (8(b)) and to remove or suspend 
individual officers or directors. (8(e)) The FDIC has delegated many of these 
powers to the regional or examiner level. Some triggers are automatic.   For in-
stance, FDIC policy requires formal action pursuant to section 8 when an in-
sured state nonmember bank falls to a CAMELS rating of 4 or 5. Historically, 
many formal actions were taken pursuant to section 8 and other laws, such as the 
Prompt Corrective Action rules. See id at __, Table 12.6. From 1980 to 1995, 
nearly 2400 formal actions were taken. Most were cease-and-desist orders under 
section 8(b) (1485 of these), termination of insurance under section 8(a) (394 of 
these), and removal of officers or directors under section 8(e) (369 of these). See 
id. 
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 Not only do bank examiners and higher-level regulators 
have tremendous authority over a range of bank decisions, but they 
control the scope and intensity of the regulatory process as well. 
Regulators enjoy enormous discretion over critical decisions in the 
supervisory process.52 They have wide latitude to decide, among 
other things, the amount of resources to devote to a particular ex-
amination;53 how often to conduct examinations; whether to con-
duct on-site or off-site examinations; whether to focus on large or 
risky banks or large or risk assets within a given bank; how to 
weight particular geographic concentrations of banks or assets;54 
how to extrapolate from past performance to predict future per-
formance of banks, assets, or particular asset classes; and how and 
how often to share information with other government agencies 
and the market.55 Although some of these are not under the control 
of individual examiners, examiners may at the very least influence 
how these issues are decided. 
 
                                                
52 Consider the decision whether to shut down a failing bank, for example. 
Statutes generally limit shutdown to “insolvent” banks. But the definition of 
insolvency is left to the discretion of the regulator. A report on bank failures 
noted that the OCC “had wide latitude to define insolvency and could have 
adopted a more flexible standard than it did . . . .” FDIC Report, supra note __ at 
457. 
53 “From 1979 through 1984 both the FDIC and the OCC reduced their ex-
aminer resources: the FDIC’s field examination staff declined 19 percent, from 
1,713 to 1,389, and the OCC’s declined 20 percent, from 2,151 to 1,722. The 
Federal Reserve’s examination capacity remained almost unchanged.” FDIC 
Report, supra note 35 at 17. 
54 Geographic concentration of losses was true in both the S&L Crisis and 
the recent Financial Crisis. During the S&L Crisis, about 75 percent of all bank 
and thrift failings were in Texas and Oklahoma. See FDIC Report at 456. For a 
more complete discussion of the issue of examination frequency in Texas and 
the Southwest during the 1980s, see O’Keefe, THE TEXAS BANKING CRISIS, 
1ჼ*14. During the recent Financial Crisis, loan losses in California, Florida, Ne-
vada, and several other states account for the bulk of the original losses that led 
to downgrades of mortgage-backed securities. See [cite needed]. 
55 Bank chartering authorities also have the power to appoint a conservator 
or receiver, and the FDIC has the power to terminate or suspend deposit insur-
ance. 
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B. Regulatory Failure in the Financial Crisis 
This section discusses the nature of regulatory failure in the 
Financial Crisis. It first offers a broad overview based on post-
mortem reports by the inspectors general of the various bank regu-
latory agencies. It then examines two emblematic bank failures 
during the Financial Crisis in order to highlight the impact that 
regulators’ compensation structure may have had. 
 
1. Anatomy of a Regulatory Failure 
The reports of inspectors general of the Treasury Depart-
ment conclude that regulators did not do enough to prevent multi-
ple banks from taking excessive risk and failing. Although acute 
funding constraints were a precipitating factor for many bank fail-
ures, this shock was not sufficient to explain bank failures. One 
report explains: “Although the deterioration in the bank’s financial 
condition was severe in 2008, the underlying risks were evident in 
the preceding years.”56 The consensus seems to be that if regula-
tors were more aggressive, hundreds of billions in losses could 
have been avoided. 
In general, regulatory failures fell into two broad but dis-
crete categories that correspond to the supervisory functions. Su-
pervision is designed (1) to recognize problems before they be-
come significant, so that actions to return the bank to a sound fi-
nancial footing can be achieved at reasonable cost, and (2) to limit 
losses to the government insurance funds by “closely monitoring 
troubled institutions, limiting their incentives to take excessive 
risks, and ensuring their prompt closure when they become insol-
vent or when their capital falls below some critical level.”57 
The first category is the failure to adequately inspect and 
supervise bank risk taking during “good” times, that is, periods 
without financial stress. We might think of this as a failure to do 
adequate preventive medicine. The failure reports describe many 
instances in which the regulators did not meet even the basic obli-
gations to understand bank risk taking, ensure compliance with ba-
sic risk policies, and restrict certain types of risk taking. For in-
                                                
56 Silver State Bank Report, supra note 35 at 31. 
57 FDIC Report, supra note 35 at ___. 
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stance, regarding the failure of IndyMac in 2008, the inspector 
general of the Treasury Department concluded: “examiners did not 
identify or sufficiently address the core weaknesses that ultimately 
caused the thrift to fail until it was too late."58 As noted above, 
problems often resulted from the failure to deploy regulatory tools 
as banks took increasingly large and risky positions. 
The second category is the failure to react to signs of dis-
tress and intervene quickly enough to prevent further damage. The 
$2.5 billion collapse of NetBank illustrates. According to the 
Treasury Department inspector general, the Office of Thrift Super-
vision “did not react in a timely and forceful manner to certain re-
peated indications of problems."59 A similar lapse preceded the $2 
billion failure of ANB Financial. The regulator – the Office of the 
Comptroller of Currency – “did not issue a formal enforcement 
action in a timely manner” after the bank began to suffer losses and 
experience distress.60  
The failure reports show that in both categories of supervi-
sion, regulators engaged in more box checking and paper work 
than aggressive oversight. For instance, WaMu’s regulator did not 
“formally track the status of examiner recommendations and [re-
quired] corrective actions.”61 Bank examiners did the important 
work of assessing bank assets and risk. They saw deficiencies and 
recommended changes, but then never followed up to see if these 
changes were being made. This same phenomenon recurred with 
                                                
58 See Office of Inspector General, Department of the Treasury, Audit Re-
port, Safety and Soundness: Material Loss Review of IndyMac Bank, Feb. 26, 
2009, available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/13059311/Indymac-Bank-Thrift-
Financial-Report. The summary of the regulators’ actions in the more than $2 
billion failure of ANB Financial National Association is typical: "OCC . . . was 
not aggressive enough in the supervision of ANB in light of the bank's rapid 
growth." OIG reports also noted the failure of bank examiners and officials in 
the nearly $1 billion failure of Omni National bank ("OCC's supervision of 
Omni National Bank was inadequate," Treasury investigators concluded); the 
nearly $2 billion collapse of New Frontier Bank (“In retrospect, a stronger su-
pervisory response at earlier examinations may have been prudent," FDIC's in-
spector general concluded); and dozens more. 
59 See Apuzzo, “Government Bank Regulators Got Big Bonuses,” supra 
note 30 . 
60 Id. 
61 WaMu Report, supra note 43. 
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shocking frequency in the recent bank failures.62 A typical report 
concluded: 
 
We found that bank management did not effectively 
implement key examiner recommendations over 
several examination cycles regarding such controls 
as loan-to-value limits, interest reserve policies, 
stress testing and establishing meaningful concen-
tration limits, and maintenance of a sufficient [al-
lowance for losses] and adequate capital structure.63 
(emphasis added). 
 
A more in-depth examination of two failures offers context. 
 
2. Silver State Bank 
Silver State Bank was a Nevada bank regulated by the 
FDIC. Like many banks, it grew rapidly during the housing boom 
of the 2000s, betting heavily on residential and commercial real 
estate, especially in and around Las Vegas. When the bank failed 
in 2008, it cost the taxpayers about $550 million, as well as oblit-
erating over $20 million in uninsured deposits.64  
Regulators knew the risks Silver State was taking and the 
fragility of its financial position for at least six years prior to its 
failure. Examiners knew of problems with Silver State’s board of 
directors and management as early as January 2002, and continued 
to report on them consistently through June 2008. Though examin-
ers repeatedly raised issues about the soundness of the bank’s 
business model, they “did not assertively address examination 
findings that were repeated areas of concern.”65  
The supervisory problem was not a lack of understanding 
but of action: “[W]hen needed, a more progressively stringent su-
pervisory tone was not presented in the [reports of examinations], 
                                                
62 Silver State Bank Report, supra note 35 at __. 
63 Id at 30. 
64 See Jake Bernstein and A.C. Thompson, “The Small Bank Bust,” PRO-
PUBLICA, Jan. 26, 2009, available at http://www.propublica.org/article/the-
small-bank-bust-090126.   
65 Silver State Bank Report, supra note 35 at __. 
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and actions were not taken.”66 More specifically, although “the 
FDIC identified [the bank’s] loan concentrations and funding 
sources as potential high-risk areas of concern in examinations 
completed as early as 2005, the FDIC took limited actions to miti-
gate the bank’s aggregate level of risk exposure.”67 
This inertia manifested most obviously in the CAMELS 
rating, the key driver of informal and formal regulatory action. De-
spite the fact that examiner reports expressed significant misgiv-
ings about the bank’s safety and soundness, the CAMELS rating 
remained a 2 (“fundamentally sound”) until May 2007, when the 
bank was on the verge of complete failure. While noting that ex-
aminers failed along many dimensions of data collection and 
analysis,68 the inspector general concluded that the bank collapsed 
not because examiners did not know about the problems,69 but be-
cause they did too little to prevent them from growing. Examiners 
did not follow through and hold the bank to account for the failures 
and shortcomings identified.  
The report does not offer compelling reasons why regula-
tors would choose to be so diligent in diagnosis but relatively inat-
tentive when it came to treatment. But it echoes a common theme 
with other failure reports: Examiners devoted far more attention 
                                                
66 “Nonetheless, our view remains that DSC could have exercised greater 
supervisory concern in the 2007 and prior examinations regarding SSB’s man-
agement, asset quality and liquidity and taken additional action to address both 
the conditions and risks in these areas.” Id at __. 
67 Id at __. 
68 See id at ___ (noting that examiners failed “to recognize and/or analyze 
risk, set a proper tone in the [examination reports]; appropriately consider risk in 
CAMELS ratings; ensure that proper controls and risk limitation and/or mitiga-
tion strategies were established and appropriately implemented; identify in a 
timely manner [the bank’] increasing risk profile, including concentrations in 
targeted market areas, as a potential concern; and deal assertively with bank 
management on examination findings and recommendations.”). 
69 The examiner’s reports recommended numerous improvements and cor-
rective actions: It “recommended that bank management improve its measuring, 
monitoring, and reporting of concentrations; internal routines and controls; loan 
underwriting and administration; . . . compliance with the FDIC’s Rules and 
Regulations . . . improve the monitoring and reporting of its economic environ-
ment and the policies and procedures covering interest reserve loans.” See id at 
__. 
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and resources to figuring out what was wrong with banks than try-
ing to fix them.70  
 
3. Washington Mutual 
The failure of WaMu tells a similar story. WaMu was the 
largest financial institution supervised by the Office of Thrift Su-
pervision.71 Right before it failed in 2008, WaMu had over 40,000 
employees working in over 2000 branch offices, servicing nearly 
$200 billion in deposits and over $125 billion in residential loans. 
In the years before its failure, WaMu refashioned its business 
model to pursue higher risk. Management decided to shift away 
from originating plain-vanilla mortgages (fixed rate, conforming 
loans) to higher-yield subprime loans.72 When the housing bubble 
burst, this decision proved fateful, as it resulted in WaMu’s col-
lapse.  
The problems at WaMu were not unknown to bank exam-
iners in the years leading up to its collapse. In the three years be-
fore its failure, examiners spent over 100,000 hours over 400 days 
pouring over WaMu’s assets and operations.73 As early as 2003, 
bank examiners had reported significant deficiencies in WaMu’s 
underwriting process for residential loans, its core loan activity.74 
Specifically, examiners noted that organizational controls were 
weak and that the sales culture was aggressively focused on build-
ing market share at the expense of quality and process. Over the 
next several years, examiners repeatedly criticized WaMu for its 
underwriting practices and overly risky incentive structures.75 Ex-
                                                
70 Although some doctors, like the fictional Dr. House on the eponymous 
Fox television program, undoubtedly diagnosis patients only for the fun of solv-
ing the puzzle, for almost all patients, the diagnosis is only relevant to treatment. 
As we discuss in the next section, examiners were paid mostly for diagnosis, and 
if healers are not paid to treat as well, there will be less treatment than if they 
are. 
71 At the time, banks effectively chose their regulators and paid regulators 
assessment revenue. From 2003 to 2008, WaMu represented 12 to 15 percent of 
OTS’s total assessment revenue. WaMu Report, supra note 43  at 16-17. 
72 Id at 8. 
73 See id at __, Table 5. 
74 See id at ___.  
75 See id at __. 
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aminers made nearly 1000 formal criticisms and recommendations 
during this period. However, they did not follow up to assure that 
problems were remedied. They brought no enforcement actions 
against WaMu, despite the fact that the problems persisted and 
worsened.76 Crucially, many of these deficiencies were in core un-
derwriting functions, which the OTS examination handbook de-
scribes as vital to safety and soundness of banks: the “first defense 
against excessive credit risk is the initial credit-granting process.”77  
Asset quality is the other essential component of safety and 
soundness. Here too examiners raised numerous issues but took no 
action. Examiners “repeatedly identified issues and weaknesses 
associated with WaMu’s asset quality,” but “[n]evertheless . . . 
consistently assessed WaMu’s asset quality as satisfactory, with a 
rating of 2 until [WaMu failed].”78 
The most likely explanation for the regulatory forbearance 
was the fact that during the period in question (2004 to 2006), 
WaMu appeared to be profitable. When asked by the inspector 
general why they did not act in the face of these numerous defi-
ciencies, examiners responded, “even though underwriting and risk 
management practices were less than satisfactory, WaMu was 
making money and loans were performing [and] [a]ccordingly, the 
examiners thought it would have been difficult to lower WaMu’s 
asset quality rating.”79 
Although one might normally commend the humility of 
regulators in the face of market indicators, such a defense is flatly 
inconsistent with the nature of the government’s role as an insurer 
of bank risk. Moreover, it contravenes explicit regulatory policy, 
which instructs examiners against taking comfort in loan and mar-
ket performance in the face of underwriting or concentration risks. 
If a bank “has a high exposure to credit risk, it is not sufficient to 
demonstrate that the loans are profitable or that the association has 
not experienced significant losses in the near term.”80 As in the 
case of underwriting standards, the inspector general found it puz-
                                                
76 See id at19-20, Table 7. 
77 Id at 21-22. 
78 Id at __. 
79 Id at __. 
80 Id at __. 
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zling that examiners did not downgrade WaMu’s CAMELS rating 
in the face of these longstanding shortcomings.81  
The WaMu examination process was emblematic of the 
regulatory failures of the Financial Crisis. As with the failure of 
Silver State Bank, IndyMac, and countless others, the report criti-
cizes examiners for not acting preventively, not tracking the im-
plementation of corrective measures, and relying solely on persua-
sion and future threats instead of formal action. 87  
 
C. A Public Choice Account 
In this section, we offer an answer to the questions raised 
by the WaMu report: Why would examiners, who repeatedly iden-
tified problem areas, continue to rate WaMu so highly in the face 
of such obvious shortcomings in its business model and practices? 
Why did examiners err so egregiously on the side of noninterven-
tion, in the face of specific policy guidance to the contrary? The 
answer is incentives.82  
 
                                                
81 Given this specific guidance, the significance of single family residential 
lending to WaMu’s business, and the OTS’s repeated warnings on asset quality 
that WaMu management seemingly ignored, it is difficult to understand how 
examiners could allow WaMu a satisfactory asset quality 2-rating for so long. 
Assigning a satisfactory rating to unsatisfactory conditions sends a mixed and 
inappropriate supervisory message to the institution and its board, and is con-
trary to the very purpose for the CAMELS rating system. 
87 See id. at __ (“OTS’s supervision did not adequately ensure that WaMu 
corrected those problems early enough to prevent a failure of the institution. 
Furthermore, OTS largely relied on a WaMu system to track the thrift’s progress 
in implementing corrective actions on hundreds of OTS examination findings.”). 
82 Another potential story of failure is that regulators were under-resourced. 
But this is difficult to square with the facts. Although the amount of resources 
devoted to examinations undoubtedly played a role in the failure of banks during 
the Financial Crisis, the numerous failure reports suggest the problem was as 
much one of incentives as it was hours devoted. For instance, the OIG report 
about WaMu’s demise describes the resources the OTS devoted to supervision. 
Over a six-year period leading up WaMu’s failure, OTS examiners spent over 
160,000 hours (about 27,000 per year on average) working exclusively on su-
pervision of WaMu. See WaMu Report, supra note 43, at 17, Table 5. Examina-
tions averaged about 150 days in length and were conducted by the equivalent of 
20 full-time employees. See id at __ (based on the data in Table 6). 
2011] PAY FOR REGULATOR PERFORMANCE 27 
DRAFT DECEMBER 2, 2011 
1. Pay for Bureaucratic Performance 
If an individual is paid regardless of performance, then the 
individual will likely maximize something other than performance. 
This might be leisure or something else, but it is unlikely to be the 
social welfare maximum.83 Like everyone else, bank examiners 
maximize according to the incentive structure in which they find 
themselves. Bank examiners are paid almost entirely in fixed sal-
ary that varies primarily by seniority. Examiners also cannot easily 
be terminated. They enjoy the special job security fashioned by the 
civil service rules. This employment arrangement may encourage 
examiners to perform the observable aspects of their charge care-
fully and conscientiously—like conducting the bank examination 
and filling out the required reports. But examiners may have insuf-
ficient incentive to pursue the less observable or more discretion-
ary aspects of their charge with the same enthusiasm.  
Job security for examiners may make some sense. With 
their fixed salaries, if examiners could be terminated for poor per-
formance, they might be extremely risk averse. For example, if a 
bank failure on an examiner’s watch significantly increased her 
risk of termination, the regulator’s incentive would be to ensure 
that the bank was not taking much risk. Though good for the regu-
lator, the social cost from reduced credit availability and lost bank 
profits might be quite high. Reduced job security might also sub-
ject examiners to political pressure for doing their jobs too well. 
Regulated banks might be able to bring political pressure to bear 
on conscientious regulators unwilling, say, to allow a failing bank 
to continue operating or to permit a bank’s excessive risk taking.84  
Job security reduces counterproductive risk aversion and 
the risk of political capture. It gives examiners discretion in apply-
ing regulation, perhaps in ways that improve social welfare. But 
without additional incentives, the civil service rules may also cre-
ate perverse incentives by insulating regulators too well from the 
                                                
83 For instance, regulators might be envious of bankers, and therefore im-
pose Draconian limitations on them, or regulators might be sympathetic to bank-
ers (either out of familiarity or a desire for future employment) and therefore 
behave permissively. One cannot be sure how these incentives cut in any given 
case; behavior is likely to vary widely by individual and over time. 
84 Cite Keating Five. 
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consequences of their job performance. So insulated, some may be 
encouraged to exert low effort or avoid courses of action likely to 
make more work for themselves.85 Job and salary security reduce 
incentives to do “good” work, however defined, since the conse-
quences of “bad” work are reduced. 
 
2. Bureaucratic Incentives 
With a fixed salary independent of performance and a re-
mote chance of termination, it is not surprising that examiners are 
not aggressive and that they focus more on observable process than 
outcomes. Performing the examination and filling out examination 
reports is entirely within the examiners’ control. This output is 
subject to objective performance metrics (e.g., is the report com-
pleted on time and in a competent manner?). Without follow-up 
enforcement, the reports are not likely to generate collateral costs 
for examiners, such as political pushback, extra work for staff, and 
error costs.86  
In contrast, aggressive follow-up enforcement is likely to 
raise the personal costs to examiners significantly with little or no 
personal benefit. Costs rise simply because the work moves from 
investigation to persuasion, both of higher-ups and the regulated 
party, each of which may push back strongly. Examiners may also 
fear making a mistake by restricting the lending of a seemingly 
successful bank. This problem may be exacerbated by the fact that 
examiners routinely work with the same bank for extended periods. 
They often go to work every day at the bank they are examining. 
While it is possible that familiarity breeds contempt, the opposite 
effect, akin to the Stockholm syndrome, may also skew regulatory 
decisions, especially where actions require confrontation. Collec-
tive action problems may also arise. Examiners or regulators who 
chose not to do the extra work could free ride to some extent on the 
more conscientious regulators, which reduces all regulators’ incen-
tives to do the work in the first place. Examiners bear little or no 
                                                
85 See Sean Gailmard & John W. Patty, Slackers and Zealots: Civil Service, 
Policy Discretion, and Bureaucratic Expertise, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 873, 874 
(positing that civil service rules select for both zealots and slackers). 
86 See JAMES Q. WILSON, WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY 
THEY DO IT 42 (1989) (describing _________). 
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risk from bank failure and gain little or nothing from bank success. 
After all, others are involved in determining success or failure. In 
the event of a failure, there is no shortage of other parties to blame. 
By contrast, if a report is not completed or done well, only the ex-
aminer is to blame. 
Moreover, the relative secrecy surrounding bank examina-
tions may also encourage regulatory inertia. Secrecy no doubt 
plays a useful role in encouraging bankers to be forthcoming with 
their examiners. Secrecy also insulates banks from the possibility 
of public overreaction to negative assessments from bank examina-
tions, thereby avoiding the runs that deposit insurance and banking 
regulation were meant to cure. At the same time, however, secrecy 
also insulates examiners and the examination process from public 
accountability. When the Securities and Exchange Commission or 
the Environmental Protection Agency issues an order or takes 
other regulatory action against a violator, that action attracts public 
scrutiny. Failure to act in the face of egregious circumstances simi-
larly attracts public attention. While public perception may not al-
ways be a useful metric for evaluating regulatory action, at the 
least it forces regulators to explain their actions—or inactions. 
Bank supervision, by contrast, is largely free from this accountabil-
ity because of the secrecy of bank examinations. Bad news about a 
bank’s condition cannot be made public.87 So the public does not 
learn of either a serious downgrade to a bank’s CAMELS rating or 
a failure to downgrade. Only when a bank has failed does the pub-
lic ever learn about a bank’s troubles, and by then, any direct con-
sequences from regulatory inertia may be difficult to detect. 
Bank examiners and regulators are subject to the same in-
terest group pressures and incentives as other regulators. It is easier 
to please a concentrated interest at the expense of a diffuse opposi-
tion than vice versa. Concentrated interests make life difficult—
they may sue, embarrass, and so forth—while diffuse interests 
rarely raise a fuss. For example, according to media accounts, 
around 2006, federal regulators noticed banks were lowering un-
derwriting standards and amassing large concentrations of com-
                                                
87 Studies do show that bank examination information does eventually leak 
out the public securities markets and over time is reflected in securities pricing. 
[CITE] 
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mercial and residential mortgage loans.88 Regulators issued very 
mild warnings to reduce the concentration risk and raise capital to 
act as a cushion against losses. The response was aggressive:  
 
Though far from a crackdown, even that mild guid-
ance was too much for banks. Thousands of indus-
try comments poured in objecting to the regulators' 
intrusion, and the FDIC and other agencies backed 
off, clarifying that they didn't intend to impose lim-
its.89 
 
Legal disputes may arise, and well-connected banks may be 
able to exert pressure through the political process in the form of 
budgetary restrictions for agencies or, worse, for individual exam-
iners. Regulators interested in not appearing before congressional 
committees, defending budgets, and being forced to testify in court 
would likely err on the side of regulatory restraint, especially when 
they do not capture the upside from aggressive regulation and do 
not bear much of the downside cost of laxity.  
 Raw partisan politics might also influence regulatory deci-
sions. The failure of Broadway Bank in Chicago is a recent exam-
ple. Alexi Giannoulias was a former senior loan officer of the 
bank, which his family controlled. The bank failed and entered 
government receivership. At the time, Giannoulias was a candidate 
for the United States Senate from Illinois. Ordinarily, regulators 
issue a “material loss report” within six months of a bank’s failure 
that estimates losses to government insurance funds. In this case, 
however, regulators delayed issuing the report, which reflected 
negatively on Giannoulias and his family, until after the election.90 
 There is also the revolving door problem. Some regulators 
are bound to get some of their expected compensation from future 
employment with regulated banks. To the extent that future em-
                                                
88 See Bernstein & Thompson, “The Small Bank Bust,” supra note 69 at __. 
89 Id. 
90 Ray Gibson, “Federal Report on Giannoulias Bank Will Come After 
Election,” CHIC. TRIB. (Oct. 22, 2010), available at 
http://newsblogs.chicagotribune.com/clout_st/2010/10/federal-report-on-
giannoulias-bank-will-come-after-election.html 
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ployment depends on acting in the public interest as regulators, 
then this form of deferred compensation might be a positive incen-
tive. If banks prefer to hire former examiners with a good record in 
having helped banks avoid failure, then the deferred compensation 
from the revolving door would act as a socially beneficial incen-
tive. If, on the other hand, banks prefer former examiners who 
acted in ways desirable to banks but ambiguous as to the public 
interest, then this could be a negative force pushing examiners to 
favor banks at the public expense. For instance, banks might prefer 
former examiners who are knowledgeable, who know the loop-
holes and the weaknesses of the regulatory agencies, and who 
above all do not raise a fuss. These traits might correspond with 
the kind of lax regulation described above, where regulators ex-
celled at identifying problems but failed miserably at doing any-
thing about them. In any event, there is no evidence that revolving 
door payouts are linked to socially optimal conduct by regulators.  
The clear incentive in the existing environment is simply to 
perform the concrete tasks – like filing out forms and making rec-
ommendations – as well as possible, and to disregard implementa-
tion on the margin, since that is where costs are likely to exceed 
benefits. After all, it takes a great effort to persuade a bank to act 
more conservatively, while there is little gain to the examiner from 
doing so, in terms of either pay or prestige. To be sure, some regu-
lators would value doing the right thing and serving the public in-
terest, but given the ambiguity of these terms and the potential for 
rationalization, the absence of monetary or reputational rewards or 
sanctions means examiners care less than they would in the pres-
ence of more high-powered incentives.  
 This is not to say that regulators were necessarily aware of 
these biases and distortions of their conduct. A common refrain in 
bank failure reports is the lack of awareness on the part of regula-
tors. For instance, regarding IndyMac, which in 2008 became one 
of the largest bank failures in history, "[Regulators] believed their 
supervision was adequate. We disagree."91 We do not doubt the 
honesty or good faith of the regulators who felt that they were do-
ing the best they could do. We simply observe that regulators are 
                                                
91 See Apuzzo, “Government Bank Regulators Got Big Bonuses,” supra 
note 30.  
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influenced in ways beyond their ken, just as we all are. They re-
spond rationally to the incentives they face, and can rationalize 
their conduct to fit to these incentives.  
 As earlier discussed, regulators apparently recognize some 
need to improve individual incentives. Certain agencies adopted 
bonus structures in the period before the Financial Crisis, but these 
one-sided bonus payments likely exacerbated the incentive prob-
lems instead of ameliorating them. As Ellen Seidman, the former 
head of the OTS, noted, “regulators were part of the problem, and 
the bonuses were a symptom.”92 Seidman attributed a large part of 
the regulatory failure to a lack of “standards for evaluating how 
well people in the regulatory system were doing” despite the fact 
that regulators thought they were doing so well. 
 Perhaps regulators thought they were doing well because 
they were maximizing to the best of their ability within their given 
incentive structure. We propose to change that incentive structure. 
 
IV. INCENTIVIZING REGULATORS 
We propose to rely on market-based incentives to improve 
banking regulation. Though our proposal may seem radical at first, 
we are not the first to propose regulator bonuses or even to recog-
nize that pay increases may improve regulators’ performance.93 
Even bank regulators support this approach.94 
 
In making compensation decisions, the OCC is mindful of 
the need to recruit and retain the very best people, and our 
merit system is aimed at accomplishing that. . . . We also 
believe it is important to reward those who worked so hard 
and showed such great professionalism throughout the cri-
sis.95 
 
                                                
92 Ellen Seidman, a research fellow at the New America Foundation think 
tank and the former head of OTS from 1997 to 2001. 
93 See supra Part II.B. 
94 See Apuzzo, “Government Bank Regulators Got Big Bonuses,” supra 
note 30 (quoting thrift office spokesman William Ruberry, “These [bo-
nuses] are meant to motivate employees, have them work hard.”).  
95 Id. 
2011] PAY FOR REGULATOR PERFORMANCE 33 
DRAFT DECEMBER 2, 2011 
Our innovation is simply to offer an unbiased, market-based ap-
proach to allocating bonuses. 
In this Part, we first present a theoretical framework for 
thinking about incentive pay for regulators. We then offer a map-
ping of our proposed incentive structure, which illustrates that 
regulators’ public-regarding incentives should be calibrated to re-
spond to the structure of bank CEOs’ private performance incen-
tives. High-powered CEO incentives require high-powered regula-
tor incentives. We next discuss incentive design issues: considera-
tions in setting the level of regulators’ incentives and anticipated 
ancillary benefits from regulatory innovation.  
 
A. A Theory of Incentive Pay for Bank Regulators 
Bank examiners enjoy enormous discretion in their super-
vision of banks, and the quality of supervision depends in large 
measure on their judicious exercise of that discretion. Incentives 
for optimal action are therefore crucial.96 These incentives could be 
achieved through a variety of means, including the use of ex ante 
performance metrics and ex post monitoring by more senior regu-
lators, coupled with the use of various carrots and sticks, including 
promotions, titles, office space, number of employees supervised, 
money, and so on.  
If superiors could design and implement this monitoring 
approach at acceptable cost, there would be little need for variable 
pay tied to objective metrics.97 But accomplishing this is often 
tricky, whether for reasons of institutional inertia, workplace poli-
tics, or otherwise. Relying solely on a monitoring approach has 
failed to produce good outcomes. Monitoring may be enormously 
difficult, especially with respect to large banks, where bank exam-
iners make innumerable discretionary decisions that are ultimately 
                                                
96 This is not to say this is the only place where incentives are important. In-
centives matter throughout the hierarchy. The right form of incentives will de-
pend on the relative costs and benefits of the different types applied at each 
stage. 
97 If such a system were optimal, there would be no need for monetary in-
centives. If it were totally ineffective, the need for monetary incentives would be 
essential. Reality likely lies somewhere along the spectrum between these two 
extremes. 
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aggregated into all-encompassing safety and soundness ratings. 
Short of a bank failure—when much of the damage has already 
been done—these myriad discretionary decisions will be difficult 
to monitor or evaluate.98 In this environment, the bureaucratic in-
centive structure earlier described may simply overwhelm what-
ever carrots and sticks are available to supervisors under the civil 
service rules. In this situation, it makes sense to rethink the funda-
mental design of the carrots and sticks. Organizations in this situa-
tion frequently resort to self-triggering pay mechanisms tied to ex-
ternal, objective metrics, like stock price. 
Corporate executive compensation offers a useful analogy. 
CEOs act as agents for shareholders, and before the 1990s, share-
holders (acting through boards of directors) tried a largely non-
monetary carrot-and-stick-plus-monitoring approach to reducing 
managerial agency costs. This approach was only modestly suc-
cessful. It generated perverse incentives for CEOs to game the 
metrics—for example, by empire building to maximize company 
size and the number of employees. Boards were often considered 
tools of their CEOs, and the payment of subjectively determined 
bonuses ostensibly tied to performance was often suspect. The pay-
for-performance revolution in executive compensation arose be-
cause the costs of better monitoring were thought to be higher than 
an approach tying compensation to self-activating, objective met-
rics. It was far simpler and more effective to link manager pay di-
rectly with shareholders’ desired outcomes (that is, to pay them 
like owners) than to design an ex ante set of performance metrics 
and then monitor to ensure the conscientious pursuit and achieve-
ment of those metrics. 
The analogy to examiners is imperfect, however, since tax-
payers are the principals and examiners do not sit at the top of their 
organizational hierarchies as CEOs do. But the incentive issues are 
generalizable to any case in which there is a tradeoff between de-
sign of internal metrics and monitoring on the one hand and objec-
tive, external metrics on the other hand. Moreover, firms offer 
other examples more closely analogous to examiners. For instance, 
salespeople often enjoy incentive pay tied to specific external met-
                                                
98 Moreover, a bank failure has multiple causes, so that even in that dra-
matic event, it may not be easy to tell whether examiners were at fault. See su-
pra Part III.C. 
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rics, like sales volume or even stock price, and oftentimes sales 
staff are the only ones in the firm hierarchy to receive this kind of 
compensation. That is, salespeople may enjoy higher-powered in-
centives than their managers. This is because salespeople occupy 
the place in the distribution chain with the greatest independence 
and discretion and where the design and monitoring of behavior is 
likely to be the most difficult. Examiners occupy an analogous 
place in the bank supervision hierarchy. Examiners are at the sharp 
end of the regulatory stick. They enjoy wide discretion in evaluat-
ing banks’ assets and operations, and as the Crisis demonstrated, 
their continuing blessing or indifference can shield a troubled bank 
from corrective action long past the point of salvageability. 
 
B. Mapping Incentive Pay for Regulators 
This section explains our approach to incentive pay for 
regulators. Figure 1 presents a conceptual framework for thinking 
about incentive compensation for bank regulators that incorporates 
the structure of bank CEO incentives. Regulators’ incentives to 
constrain excessive bank risk taking must be adequately matched 
to bank CEO incentives to pursue excessive risk. Otherwise, regu-
lators may be insufficiently motivated to fend off bankers’ risk 
plays.99  
On the vertical axis is the level of effort exerted by the 
agent, be it bank CEO or regulator; on the horizontal axis is the 
purpose or end goal of that effort. At the left end of the horizontal 
axis is the private purpose of shareholder wealth maximization; at 
the right end is the public purpose to avoid losses to the govern-
ment insurance fund. Both axes are measured from the point of 
view of the principal for the agent in question: shareholders and 
the public, respectively.  
 
1. Performance Pay for Bankers 
In this framework, the ideal point from the perspective of 
shareholders of an ordinary company would be high effort for the 
                                                
99 See Hannes, supra note 19, at 390 (proposing high-powered equity-based 
incentives for auditors in order to counter managers’ incentives to artificially 
inflate share prices). 
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purely private interests of the company. This is the upper left cor-
ner of our Purpose-Effort compensation space in Figure 1. Com-
pensation contracts we observe for public company executives aim 
for this corner solution, but given positive agency costs, the practi-
cal result is a deviation in the direction of lower effort. In addition, 
given the business judgment rule and other permissive rules that 
enable corporate agents to pursue goals other than shareholder 
wealth maximization, there may be deviation toward public pur-
poses as well.  
 
  
 
FIGURE 1 
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Prior to the Financial Crisis, bank CEOs were roughly in 
the same part of the Figure 1 compensation space as CEOs of non-
financial firms, since the CEOs of large multi-national corpora-
tions and large bank holding companies had very similar compen-
sation contracts. CEOs of both kinds were paid mostly in stock and 
stock options, which are designed to move CEOs as close to the 
shareholder ideal point as is efficient given monitoring costs.  
The Financial Crisis, however, brought into clear focus the 
need to alter bankers’ pay packages to include a greater element of 
public purpose. Given the government guarantees, either implicit 
(as in the bailouts of Citigroup and AIG) or explicit (as with FDIC 
insurance), undergirding bank risk taking, bank shareholders do 
not suffer the full costs from the risk taking that comes with paying 
bank CEOs to maximize shareholder value. Bank shareholders 
therefore have even stronger incentives than shareholders of nonfi-
nancial firms to push their agents toward the shareholder ideal 
point. In this context, paying bank CEOs to maximize bank share-
holder value may result in socially inefficient levels of risk, includ-
ing systemic risk.  
Though banks are private companies, their importance to 
the economy and to the public, as well as their fragility in the face 
of runs, provides the justification for government guarantees. At 
the same time, however, the socially ideal point for banks in Figure 
1 cannot be the shareholder ideal point. Instead, because social 
goals as well as private goals should inform banks’ conduct, the 
social welfare ideal point toward which banks should strive is 
somewhere to the right of the shareholder ideal point—that is, 
away from private shareholder wealth maximization on the hori-
zontal axis and toward the public goal of avoiding losses to the 
government insurance fund. We are agnostic about the appropriate 
proximity of the social welfare ideal point to the corner solution of   
avoiding all losses to the government insurance fund. We leave 
space between the Social welfare ideal point and the upper right 
corner in order to account for the real possibility that maximizing 
social welfare may require a level of bank risk taking greater than 
what would assure no losses to the government insurance fund. 
Moreover, the location along the horizontal axis of this Social wel-
fare ideal point likely varies by the type of financial institution, 
market context, individual CEO, and other factors. We can only be 
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confident that it lies somewhere to the right of the shareholder 
ideal point.  
Because of the public as well as private purposes that ani-
mate banking and government support for banking, CEOs of 
banks, bank holding companies, and other systemically important 
financial institutions should be given incentives to take account of 
the social costs of bank risk taking and bank failure.100 It is un-
likely that bank CEO compensation was optimally set prior to the 
Financial Crisis. Understandably, then, the various academic pro-
posals for banker pay reform discussed earlier seek to move the 
average bank CEO’s compensation contract in the direction of 
greater public purpose, that is, toward the social welfare ideal 
point and away from the shareholder ideal point.  
The Bank CEOs arrow in Figure 1 illustrates. Proposed re-
forms attempt to move CEO compensation contracts from their 
current location somewhere into quadrant I, as shown on Figure 
1.101 Any move in quadrant I increases the public purpose of CEO 
effort and would therefore be a valuable change according to these 
reforms.102 In general, moves in the direction of the social welfare 
ideal point are likely to be social welfare improvements.  
Moves into quadrant IV, which also increase the public 
purpose of CEO actions, might also be improvements, but this 
would depend on the tradeoff with reduced CEO effort. It might be 
that the gains from being more public welfare regarding would be 
greater than the efficiency losses from increased slack, but it is un-
certain. What is clear is that any moves into quadrants II or III 
would not be improvements. 
 
                                                
100 For CEOs of public companies, by contrast, issues of systemic risk are 
largely irrelevant. Therefore no public purpose need be included as part of their 
optimal compensation contract. 
101 Ironically, Dodd-Frank’s say-on-pay provision, requiring a shareholder 
vote to approve executives’ pay, may actually move bank CEO compensation 
contracts away from the Social welfare ideal point and into quadrant II, where 
shareholders generally prefer their CEOs to focus.  
102 A move along the vertical axis, that is, additional effort without any ad-
ditional public purpose, would obviously not satisfy these goals, while a move 
along the horizontal axis in quadrant I would.  
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2. Performance Pay for Regulators 
We now turn to regulator pay. As shown on Figure 1, the 
moves are analytically similar to the goal of improving bank CEO 
pay. Because of their low-powered incentives and job security, 
regulators are thought to exert less effort than the regulated. At the 
same time, regulators act more in the public interest than in the 
private interest of the banks they regulate. Regulators do not act 
purely in the public interest for familiar reasons of capture, be it 
from familiarity, the revolving door enticement, or some other 
cause. The public, who are the principals in this compensation bar-
gain, would prefer that regulators expend more effort toward the 
public interest. The location of the social welfare ideal point on 
Figure 1 captures this idea. Our proposal hopes to nudge regulators 
in that direction. And as shown by the relative slopes of the two 
reform vectors, our proposal is more focused on improving effort 
than improving purpose, while the banker compensation reform 
literature has the opposite emphasis.  
The structure of regulator incentives and bank CEO incen-
tives are related. For example, from bank shareholders’ perspec-
tive, the optimal private incentives for bank CEOs may depend on 
what risks and growth opportunities the regulatory environment 
will permit.103 Similarly, for our purposes, the appropriate direc-
tion and magnitude of regulators’ incentives will depend to a great 
extent on the structure of bank CEOs’ incentives. The more high 
powered are bank CEOs’ private incentives to maximize share-
holder wealth, the more high powered must regulators’ incentives 
be in the direction of the public interest. That is, regulators’ public-
regarding incentives should be strong enough to counter the private 
risk taking incentives that banks create for their CEOs, to the ex-
tent such risk taking may be socially suboptimal. 
                                                
103 See Anthony J. Crawford et al., Bank CEO Pay-Performance Relations 
and the Effects of Deregulation, 68 J. BUS. 231 (1995) (finding that bank CEO 
pay became more high powered with the banking deregulation of the 1980s); 
Vicente Cuñat & Maria Guadalupe, Executive Compensation and Competition in 
the Banking and Financial Sectors, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 495 (2009) (same for 
1990s banking deregulation); R. Glenn Hubbard & Darius Palia, Executive Pay 
and Performance: Evidence from the U.S. Banking Industry, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 
105 (1995) (finding a positive association between bank CEO pay and firm per-
formance in the 1980s and a stronger association in deregulated markets). 
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As with bank CEOs, it may be that regulators’ moves in 
quadrant IV (less effort; more public regarding) would be socially 
efficient, but these are not likely to arise from our approach to in-
creasing the incentives for effort. (We can imagine other proposals 
that might make regulators more public regarding without neces-
sarily increasing their effort.) More difficult to judge in the abstract 
are moves into quadrant II. Although not the main focus of our 
proposal, it is possible that incentives to work hard may move 
regulators into this quadrant (more effort; more private regarding). 
In this case, the gains from additional effort in helping banks to be 
more efficient and reducing regulatory burdens might be social 
welfare improving. That is, the gains may exceed the costs of ex-
pected social losses from bank failures. The recent Financial Crisis 
cautions against putting too much faith in this expectation, so our 
proposal makes every effort to encourage additional effort for 
regulators directed into quadrant I (and toward the social welfare 
ideal point), instead of quadrant II.104 
No incentives are perfect, however, so we do not expect 
bank regulators ever to reach the Social welfare ideal point. But 
with better regulatory efforts in that direction, regulatory influence 
may drive banks’ vector of activity more closely toward the public 
interest. 
 
C. How Much Incentive? 
An important preliminary question is the appropriate mag-
nitude of the incentive component of regulatory pay. We anticipate 
that a fixed salary will continue to constitute the lion’s share of 
                                                
104 It is also possible that regulators might start to the right of the social wel-
fare point. They may harbor too strong a sense of purpose to protect the deposit 
insurance fund or taxpayers. Therefore, their socially optimal moves would be in 
quadrant II. Although this does not seem to be the case for many regulators dur-
ing the Crisis, when combined with the possibility of low effort, the case is 
stronger that some of this may have been going on. Very low effort combined 
with even extremely strong motives to reduce taxpayer losses could still explain 
the Financial Crisis. In such cases, a more shareholder-regarding motivation 
could incentivize examiners toward the social welfare optimum. The use of bank 
equity in examiner compensation is designed to achieve this goal, as we describe 
below.  See infra Part XX. 
 
2011] PAY FOR REGULATOR PERFORMANCE 41 
DRAFT DECEMBER 2, 2011 
regulator pay. At the same time, the incentive component should 
be large enough to offer real incentive to the regulator, without 
swamping the regulator’s salary in importance. Too small an in-
centive component risks irrelevance, of course, but too large an 
incentive component may stoke regulatory risk aversion.  
Incentive pay is by definition variable, and a larger per-
centage of incentive pay broadens the range of total pay that the 
regulator can expect to receive—i.e., puts more risk on the regula-
tor. If the incentive component is so large that the regulator cannot 
afford to suffer a loss, she might simply take the conservative 
course, adopting a maximin strategy.105 She would be willing to 
forego any potential gains from being aggressive or innovative in 
order to avoid any losses.  
Consider an examiner with a base salary of $100,000 and a 
variable pay component with three possible outcomes: plus 
$40,000, minus $40,000, and zero. If she regulates aggressively, 
she stands a 50-50 chance of gaining or losing $40,000; if she 
regulates conservatively, her variable pay will be zero for sure. If 
she is risk neutral and has low fixed costs, then she should be fi-
nancially indifferent between aggressive and conservative regula-
tion, since the total expected value in both cases is $100,000. But a 
risk averse examiner with larger fixed costs might strongly prefer 
the conservative approach, since she will net $100,000 for sure. 
Aggressive regulation is too risky, since the examiner runs a 50% 
chance of winding up with a $40,000, netting only $60,000 in total 
pay. That possibility is sufficiently unattractive that even the 
chance to make $140,000 would not induce her to regulate aggres-
sively.  
The design of the incentive securities will of course be im-
portant in managing the variance in the incentive component of 
regulator pay. We tentatively suggest that incentive pay should 
constitute up to 25 percent of the regulator’s total pay at the start of 
the relevant incentive period, but this is just an informed guess. 
Agency heads who give thought to our general idea and better un-
derstand the tradeoffs between financial incentives and other fac-
                                                
105 In game theory, this is a strategy designed to maximize one’s minimum 
payoff. See, e.g., DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 
(1998). 
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tors may have good reasons for greater or lower percentages, espe-
cially after some trial and error. 
 
D. Incentives to Innovate 
Our performance pay scheme would not only help amelio-
rate the sorts of “false negative” failures that facilitated the Crisis, 
but by giving bank examiners economic stakes in regulated banks, 
our approach might also spur regulatory innovation. 
Under the current fixed salary approach, examiners have no 
strong incentive to change the regulatory system in ways that im-
prove or protect bank values or taxpayer interests. Instead, as with 
the inertia they demonstrated in the face of bad news at their regu-
lated banks preceding the Crisis, examiners may prefer just to do 
what they are told and work to the letter of the examinations man-
ual.  
With a stake in the bank’s value, an examiner may come up 
with ways to examine more efficiently—say, by streamlining the 
examination process at her specific bank or working with higher 
level regulators to initiate broad-based changes. More stringent 
supervision might evolve as well. An examiner might more aggres-
sively seek out information from the bank in order to enhance the 
precision of her assessment of the bank’s situation. This might also 
lead to broader-based change across banks as individual examiners 
began to experiment. For example, the level of banks’ public dis-
closures may be suboptimal because of market failures that regula-
tors can solve.106 The individual examiner may not be able to cap-
ture the entire value of her innovation, but having some economic 
stake in the process at least moves her in the right direction.  
One might be skeptical that there is much that examiners 
could do to increase firm value through regulatory innovation. But 
there is evidence that regulatory choices matter. In the period be-
fore the Financial Crisis, banks had a choice of regulator, and regu-
latory agencies competed to offer the most attractive set of regula-
tions and regulatory policies. The premise must have been a belief 
by banks that they could increase their share price by choosing the 
“best” regulator. No doubt this scenario, like our proposal, creates 
                                                
107 See supra __ and accompanying text. 
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the potential for a race to the bottom. For our part, we hope to 
solve this problem by not only awarding regulators the gains from 
making regulations more efficient but also penalizing them when 
their regulatory choices result in bank losses or failures. But the 
point remains that regulatory choices undoubtedly can increase 
bank value. Cabined by the downside constraint on “deregulation,” 
we nevertheless believe that some of this value remains, or should 
at least be something regulators pursue. 
 
* * * 
 
Although the theoretical case for linking bank regulators’ 
pay to bank performance seems relatively straightforward, the de-
tails of the incentive structure are crucial. In the next Part, we take 
a first pass at structuring a regulatory pay-for-performance con-
tract, recognizing that efficient contracts will only be developed 
over time through trial and error. 
 
 
V. THE STRUCTURE OF PERFORMANCE PAY FOR REGULATORS 
 The regulatory laxity in the run-up to the Financial Crisis 
involved two distinct types of regulatory failure—the failure to ap-
ply preventive medicine when times were good and the failure to 
act aggressively when a bank showed signs of distress.107 Regula-
tors’ incentive pay should have two distinct components to address 
these separate problems. The first is a variable compensation com-
ponent based on the market value of a mix of the regulated bank’s 
debt- and equity-based securities. This debt-equity portfolio would 
offer real time market feedback to the regulator regarding the 
bank’s risk taking and its potential rewards. This component would 
matter primarily during good times, while the bank is operating in 
the ordinary course. Its purpose is to incentivize preventive and 
remedial measures well before a bank approaches distress. The 
second component becomes important as a bank approaches dis-
tress. It consists of a bonus for which the regulator would be eligi-
ble based on the timing of her decision to take over a failing bank. 
Regulators have a number of reasons to wait too long before put-
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ting a failing bank into resolution.108 The takeover bonus would 
ameliorate this problem. 
We elaborate on these various features of our regulatory 
pay-for-performance scheme below. 
 
A. The Debt-Equity Portfolio 
We take lessons from the executive compensation literature 
to structure our debt-equity portfolio for regulators. For the typical 
firm manager, pay is linked to stock price, which is the best avail-
able metric for the value of the firm, as well as the social value of 
the enterprise. Although imperfect, managers paid with firm shares 
have greater incentives to increase the value of the firm than man-
agers paid fixed salaries.  
If there were no externalities from individual bank activity 
or risk levels, we could stop there. But of course externalities exist. 
Risk taking at one bank can affect the financial stability of other 
banks and the banking system as a whole, as the Great Financial 
Crisis has amply illustrated. Together with the bank runs from the 
numerous panics of the 19th Century, the Great Depression, and the 
S&L Crisis, these episodes confirm that individual banks’ activi-
ties have stronger social welfare implications than non-financial 
firms. Hence the need for bank managers to be compensated in a 
way that accounts for the potential social losses from their deci-
sions, as recent reform proposals argue. Our claim is that this is 
also true for regulators. 
As is true for bank managers, there is a ready proxy for the 
potential bank losses that may fall on taxpayers. A publicly traded 
debt instrument is sensitive to the downside risk of its issuer; it 
therefore provides the downside analog of what share price signals 
about upside potential. While it may make sense for bank manag-
ers to focus mostly on increasing bank value subject to some 
downside risk, the opposite is likely true for regulators. If we could 
design an optimal contract for CEOs, regulators might be unneces-
sary, but absent such a perfect contract, a division of labor in 
which managers focus mostly on gains while regulators worry 
most about losses might be the most efficient. Accordingly, we be-
                                                
108  See supra Part III.B. 
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lieve the lion’s share of regulator’s debt-equity portfolio should 
consist of the debt-based instrument. This would give the regulator 
a personal financial stake in curbing excessive risk taking at the 
bank. Holding only debt incentives, however, might cause the 
regulator to be too risk averse, which would unnecessarily limit 
credit availability and the bank’s profitability. We therefore also 
include equity-based pay in the regulator’s pay package.109  
 
B. Structuring the Debt-Equity Portfolio 
For both debt and equity components, awarding the actual 
securities is not necessary.110 Instead, the underlying securities 
would be used as benchmarks, with incentive pay based on the 
market price of the underlying securities after a given reference 
date. For example, if performance and incentive pay were awarded 
each calendar year, the examiner would receive a “phantom” allo-
cation of the bank’s debt- and equity-based instruments at the be-
ginning of each year. This avoids the conventional objections to 
government ownership of stakes in private businesses and the po-
tential for insider trading by that might arise when regulators sell 
securities to monetize gains. 
To encourage a medium- to long-term regulatory perspec-
tive, each year’s allocation would have a specified maturity. At 
maturity, say three to five years after the initial award, the alloca-
tion would be cashed out at the then-market values of its underly-
ing debt and equity components. With regular periodic allocations 
with multi-year maturities, the regulator would hold multiple 
                                                
109 The pay of bank managers and regulators might be related. Though they 
play separate and somewhat opposing roles, their respective pay structures could 
be substitutes for each other. The more bank managers are paid in bank stock, 
the more regulators would need to be paid in bank debt in order to police the 
extra risk taking that bank managers would be incentivized to pursue. Share-
holders of a bank might alter the pay of bank managers in light of regulator pay 
structures, and vice versa. We leave it to another paper and a formal model in 
development to explore these issues more fully. For now we simply claim that 
given the heavy equity weighting of bank CEO pay, regulators’ pay should fo-
cus mostly on debt. 
110 The examiner should not be allowed to trade in any of the bank’s securi-
ties or instruments in any event, so holding the underlying securities would not 
only be unnecessary. It would be forbidden. See infra Part __.  
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tranches of phantom securities with staggered payouts,111 giving 
her incentive to consider the long-term as well as short-term con-
sequences of her regulatory decisions, and making short-term ma-
nipulations of securities prices an unattractive strategy. We do not 
attempt to divine the optimal maturity of each debt-equity alloca-
tion, which we imagine would vary by agency, bank, time period, 
examiner, and other factors. We anticipate that the optimal matur-
ity will develop over time based on experience. 
Below, we describe a range of possible approaches for im-
plementing the examiner’s debt-equity portfolio. 
 
1. Bank Debt Incentives 
We consider two potential benchmarks on which the debt 
feature of this package could be based: (i) a subordinated debt se-
curity issued by the bank or (ii) a credit default swap contract 
(CDS) referencing a junior debt obligation of the bank holding 
company that is the parent of the regulated bank.112 The prices of 
publicly traded subordinated debt securities and CDS contracts re-
flect the market’s best estimate of the risk of default of the bank 
underlying the security or contract. We would adjust debt prices 
for compensation purposes in order to filter out the effects of in-
dustry-wide or market-wide debt price movements. To the extent 
possible, the regulator’s incentive pay should reflect bank-specific 
developments and not changes in debt markets generally. 
Subordinated debt is junior to depositor liabilities, and of 
course is uninsured. When a bank fails, subordinated debt holders 
rarely recover anything.113 Similarly, when a banking institution 
defaults on a debt obligation referenced in a CDS, this triggers the 
                                                
111 For example, with a three-year holding period, after three years, the 
regulator would always hold three tranches of phantom securities, which would 
mature in succession at the next three calendar years’-end.  
112 A CDS acts like a debt instrument insofar as its trading price will reflect 
the default risk of the reference entity. The CDS spread—the price one would 
have to pay to insure against the reference entity’s default—rises and falls with 
the probability of default. As discussed below, with respect to CDS contracts 
referencing banking institutions, the reference obligation is almost always a 
BHC debt obligation, and not an obligation of the bank itself. See infra __.  
113 See Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks are Not Allowed in 
Bankruptcy, ________.  
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obligation of the CDS seller to pay the CDS purchaser for losses 
sustained on the insured amount of the banking entity’s defaulted 
debt. Sub-debt holders and CDS sellers therefore have important 
incentives to monitor bank risk taking. If a bank is healthy, its debt 
securities will trade near face value.114 Similarly, the price of its 
CDS contracts will be low.  
When bank risk taking is excessive, however, sub-debt 
holders will sell their debt. The market for subordinated bank debt 
is well established,115 and banks engaging in excessively risky 
strategies will see their sub-debt trading prices drop.116 If the bank 
is at risk of default, its debt securities will trade at a discount re-
flecting the probability of default and the estimated payout in such 
event. Similarly, the price of a CDS contract reflects the expected 
losses from loans, bonds, or other reference obligations issued by 
the underlying bank. CDS spreads for contracts written on large 
publicly traded financial institutions react very quickly to new in-
formation.117 Therefore, as bank risk taking increases, CDS dealers 
will raise the price at which they are willing to sell CDS protection 
for the banking institution’s debt.   
                                                
114 They may even trade above face value if market interest rates have 
dropped since the debt securities were issued. 
115 See infra note XX and accompanying text; Laurence H. Meyer, Super-
vising Large Complex Banking Organizations: Adapting to Change, in PRUDEN-
TIAL SUPERVISION, supra note XX, at 97, 103. 
116 Douglas D. Evanoff & Larry D. Wall, Sub-debt Yield Spreads as Bank 
Risk Measures, 20 J. FIN. SERVICES RES. 121, 133−35 (2001) (showing that sub-
debt yield spreads perform slightly better than capital measures as predictors of 
banks’ financial condition); Mark J. Flannery & Sorin M. Sorescu, Evidence of 
Bank Market Discipline in Subordinated Debenture Yields: 1983–1991, 51 J. 
FIN. 1347, 1373−74 (1996) (demonstrating that bond yields reflect investors’ 
pricing of bank risk taking); Diana Hancock & Myron L. Kwast, Using Subordi-
nated Debt to Monitor Bank Holding Companies: Is it Feasible?, 20 J. FIN. 
SERVICES RES. 147, 147 (2001) (finding that bonds of highest liquidity offer the 
most consistent pricing information for purposes of reflecting bank default risk).  
117 Mark J. Flannery, Joel F. Houston & Frank Partnoy, Credit Default Swap 
Spreads as Viable Substitutes for Credit Ratings, 158 U. PENN. L. REV. 2085 
(2010). Hart and Zingales also propose to incorporate CDS pricing into the regu-
latory apparatus, noting its ability to reflect excessive risk at the reference entity. 
They would use CDS, however, as merely a trigger for regulatory action; they 
do not propose incentive pay for regulators or the use of CDS in that endeavor. 
Oliver Hart & Luigi Zingales, A New Capital Regulation for Large Financial 
Institutions (Sept. 2009). 
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Market pricing serves as a transparent and continuing sig-
nal of the riskiness of the bank’s activities. Risk-related price fluc-
tuations will directly affect bank examiners’ wealth when the debt 
component is included in their personal portfolios. In this way, the 
fine reflection of bank risk taking generates both important incen-
tive and information effects. The debt feature of an incentive con-
tract would give the examiner incentive to be vigilant in policing 
excessive risk taking at the bank. 
 Using CDS or sub-debt as a benchmark for examiner pay 
also serves an important related function. Market pricing acts 
gradually to signal changes in the issuing bank’s risk profile, in 
contrast to the sudden meltdowns that occurred at WaMu and other 
banks that failed in the Crisis when regulators were too timid. In-
corporating market-priced debt instruments as part of regulator pay 
not only creates incentives for careful risk analysis; it also makes 
price changes more salient to examiners and their supervisors as an 
indicator of the capital market sentiment concerning risk taking at 
the given bank. This greater prominence for crowd wisdom may 
make it more difficult for regulators to ignore mounting evidence 
of trouble at a given bank. This information could be valuable as a 
warning signal for an examiner to devote more resources to an ex-
amination or a follow-up enforcement action. It might also be suf-
ficiently finely tuned to give direct feedback on micro level regula-
tory changes. Just as a stock price offers immediate signals to 
managers with imperfect information, so too might public debt in-
struments help regulators adjust their allocations of time and effort. 
Empirical evidence supports the idea that regulators would 
respond to debt incentives. Studies have shown, for nonfinancial as 
well as financial firms,118 that firm risk taking declines as the pro-
portion of a CEO’s wealth held in the form of her firm’s debt—
“inside” debt—increases relative to the value of her equity hold-
ings. The presence of this inside debt shifts CEOs’ personal inter-
                                                
118 See, e.g., Tung & Wang, Bank CEOs, Inside Debt Compensation, and 
the Global Financial Crisis, supra note __ at __ (arguing .. . );  Patrick Bolton et 
al., “Executive Compensation and Risk Taking,” Working Paper, May 2010 
(finding this for financial firms); Chenyang Wei & David Yermack, “Stock-
holder and Bondholder Reactions to Revelations of Large CEO Inside Debt 
Holdings: An Empirical Analysis,” Working Paper, 2010 (finding this for nonfi-
nancial firms). 
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ests away from risk-preferring equity, aligning their interests more 
closely with relatively risk averse debt holders.119  
There is a theoretical explanation for this effect.120 Inside 
debt counters the risk-shifting incentives that accompany CEOs’ 
equity compensation.121 Giving managers a stake in the value of 
the firm’s debt makes them less willing to sacrifice its value to 
benefit shareholders, which is especially important when the firm 
is in distress. Debt compensation can improve managerial effort 
and firm value in distress situations because, unlike equity, debt is 
sensitive to the firm’s liquidation value. That is, debt holders may 
still recover value when the firm is in distress.122 Managers holding 
inside debt may therefore be less inclined to make risky bets when 
the firm gets into trouble.123 
Similarly, regulators with a stake in the value of a bank’s 
debt instruments will be less inclined to turn a blind eye to bank-
ers’ excessively risky bets. Public trading prices of bank debt will 
                                                
119 “Top management should . . . be given incentives to act on behalf of deb-
tholders to an adequate degree. . . . [P]roviding managers with compensation 
structures that have low pay-performance sensitivity may be optimal.” John & 
Qian, supra note XX, at 110. Such compensation would admittedly dissuade 
bank executives from the traditional pursuit of value for shareholders, which is 
sometimes viewed as corporate managers’ exclusive goal. This should not give 
us much pause, however. Bank governance has traditionally been recognized as 
presenting special concerns that deserve special governance tools. See supra 
notes, XX and accompanying text. 
120 Edmans & Liu, supra note XX, at 78. 
121 While Jensen and Meckling consider the agency costs of equity and debt 
separately, see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 25, at 312, Edmans and Liu con-
sider them simultaneously, thereby enabling analysis of the tradeoffs between 
incentivizing managerial effort and influencing investment choice. See Edmans 
& Liu, supra note XX, at 79 & n.5. 
122 Equity holders are indifferent to the firm’s liquidation value because that 
value goes to pay creditors. So while equity-based compensation gives managers 
an incentive to avoid insolvency, it may also induce them to “inefficiently sacri-
fice liquidation value to gamble for solvency” when a firm is in distress. Edmans 
& Liu, supra note XX, at 77. Debt holders will be less sanguine about squander-
ing value on desperate investment strategies because their returns are fixed; they 
will not share in any (low probability but) stupendous returns beyond the fixed 
amount of their claims. Id. 
123 The appropriate amount of debt depends on the relative magnitudes of 
the two different types of agency problems—shirking versus risk shifting. Id.  
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operate as a continuing public referendum on risk taking at the 
bank.  
 
2. Subordinated Debt versus CDS 
While both bank subordinated debt and CDS could offer 
important incentives and market information for regulators, there 
are important differences between the two, such that their best uses 
may be different. As between subordinated bank debt and CDS, 
evidence exists that CDS prices react more quickly to information 
than subordinated debt prices do.124 This sensitive bellwether 
would therefore offer more immediate feedback to regulators than 
subordinated debt, so that prompt action could be taken. 
Subordinated debt, however, may offer a few advantages 
over CDS. Unlike sub-debt, which is issued at the bank level as 
well as the BHC level, CDS contracts are typically written with 
reference to BHC debt obligations and not those of the banking 
subsidiary.125 Therefore, CDS prices will more accurately reflect 
the default risk of the BHC than the bank itself. Major banks are 
almost uniformly held as wholly owned subsidiaries of BHCs, and 
every BHC owns other financial institutions besides the bank at 
issue, although for the very largest banks, each bank constitutes the 
dominant subsidiary within its BHCs. The larger is the percentage 
of the BHC’s cash flow and assets that derive from the given bank, 
the better will CDS pricing (that references BHC debt) reflect risk 
at the bank. But as the proportions of BHC assets and earnings 
contributed by the bank decrease, so will the clarity of CDS 
spreads decrease as a signal of the bank’s health. Bank of America, 
N.A., for example, is the dominant entity within its BHC, Bank of 
America Corporation. Yet the bank represents only about 65% of 
BHC assets and contributes only about 70% of BHC net income. 
Performance of the other entities within the BHC will likely have a 
nontrivial effect on overall BHC performance, so that CDS spreads 
                                                
124 Blanco, Brennan, & Marsh, An Empirical Analysis of the Dynamic Rela-
tion between Investment-Grade Bonds and Credit-Default Swaps, 60 J. FIN. 
2255 (2005). 
125 We found one exception for which public pricing information was avail-
able. Bloomberg quotes CDS pricing for Capital One Bank, a banking subsidi-
ary of financial holding company Capital One Financial Corporation. 
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on Bank of America Corporation may only offer a noisy proxy for 
risk taking at the bank, Bank of America, N.A. 
A second limitation with CDS is coverage. Most large 
banks issue subordinated debt that is publicly traded. By contrast, 
regular CDS pricing data is available for only a handful of the very 
largest BHCs.126 The very largest banks and BHCs are of course 
the most important in terms of asset values and systemic risk, so 
CDS still might be best for those institutions. Where both bank 
sub-debt and BHC CDS pricing are available, it might be useful to 
incorporate both into the debt component of regulators’ incentive 
pay. 
3. BHC Equity 
The debt component of regulator incentive pay should be 
balanced with equity incentives in order to guard against the possi-
bility of excessive risk aversion.127 Ideally, one would use bank 
equity as the benchmark, since its trading price would offer the 
cleanest market assessment of the bank’s upside prospects, and 
therefore the best proxy for value added by regulators. Again, 
however, because major banks are almost uniformly held as wholly 
owned subsidiaries of BHCs, no major bank has publicly traded 
equity. BHC equity is the next best option, though it may offer a 
somewhat noisy proxy for performance at the banking subsidi-
ary.128 
Rather than rewarding (or punishing) the regulator simply 
based on BHC equity price movements, we propose two adjust-
ments to hone the regulator’s incentives. First, as with our debt 
component, we suggest a relative performance approach, pursuant 
to which the effect of industry-wide or market-wide equity price 
                                                
126 A Bloomberg search showed only nine BHCs with regular CDS pricing 
information. 
127 Too much debt in managers’ compensation packages may make them 
suboptimally risk averse, reducing long term value. Rangarajan K. Sundaram & 
David L. Yermack, Pay Me Later: Inside Debt and Its Role in Managerial 
Compensation, 62 J. FIN. 1551, 1553 (2007); David I. Walker, The Challenge of 
Improving the Long-Term Focus of Executive Pay, 51 B.C. L. REV. 435, 446–47 
(2010). We can anticipate a similar effect if regulators’ portfolios are exces-
sively overweighted with debt. 
128 Among the ten largest banks, the average bank accounts for 61% of its 
BHC’s assets and 131% of its earnings. See Appendix I for details [to come]. 
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movements would be filtered out of the regulator’s performance 
pay. Ideally, an incentive compensation scheme would reward an 
agent for only those effects within her control. But because no pub-
lic securities exist to measure regulatory inputs alone, we must set-
tle for second-best. To the extent we are able to excise market- and 
industry effects from the regulator’s incentive pay, that works an 
improvement to our scheme. 
 In addition to the relative performance adjustment, we sug-
gest that the regulator should be exposed only to the upside of the 
equity, and not the downside. In other words, the regulator can 
only win with the equity-based component. The reason for this is 
that exposure to downside equity volatility might make the regula-
tor too timid. With equity value to lose, the regulator may be reluc-
tant, for example, to expose poor management or risky practices at 
the bank. The holding period for debt-equity allocations addresses 
that problem to some extent. Given the inertia exhibited by regula-
tors in the run up to the Financial Crisis, however, we should be 
careful not to inadvertently incentivize inaction. This does not 
mean that the regulator has nothing lose, of course. The debt com-
ponent of her incentive pay includes downside potential but likely 
with less volatility than equity. 
 
4. The Appropriate Mix of Debt and Equity 
As earlier noted, we believe the lion’s share of this ordinary 
course “preventive medicine” component of incentive pay should 
be debt-based. Beyond that, the appropriate debt-equity mix in the 
regulator’s portfolio will depend on a number of factors, some of 
which will be specific to the regulated bank, to the regulating 
agency, to the particular times, and perhaps even to the individual 
examiner. We therefore make no attempt to offer firm prescriptions 
for the right ratio. Instead, we discuss important considerations that 
regulatory agencies should consider when structuring each regula-
tor’s portfolio. 
The right mix can induce regulators to care about bank 
profits but not at the expense of risk shifting to creditors. Excessive 
bank risk would diminish net incentive pay, provided that the 
negative reaction from debt markets reduced the value of the debt 
component of the regulator’s incentive portfolio by more than any 
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positive reaction from equity markets augmented the value of the 
equity component of the regulator’s portfolio. 
We are confident that the optimal mix can best be deter-
mined through trial and error. Potential error costs, however, coun-
sel for a gradual implementation of our proposal. Unlike executive 
compensation, where experimentation can and does occur among 
thousands of private firms, and a given firm’s poor pay design  
would be unlikely to have widespread impact, error costs may be 
high with regulator incentive compensation design. There are only 
a few bank regulatory agencies, and a significant design mistake 
could affect the entire banking sector, and perhaps beyond. Agency 
heads should therefore proceed slowly and incrementally. The ap-
propriate debt-equity mix is an area for which more study and a 
conservative approach are likely warranted. 
 
C. The Takeover Decision 
 In addition to the market-based ordinary course component 
of incentive pay, we advocate an additional feature to address the 
bank in distress. Specifically, we propose a bonus tied to the tim-
ing of the decision to take over a failing bank. Especially for larger 
banks, examiners will not enjoy unilateral authority to put the bank 
into resolution. Instead, the decision will involve higher-level su-
pervisors as well as examiners. Incentive pay for examiners still 
makes sense in this context. Examiners will have the best informa-
tion about their banks’ condition and prospects, and their experi-
ence with their banks will be critical in determining the optimal 
timing of resolution. Even absent formal authority to decide on 
resolution by themselves, examiners will enjoy enormous influence 
over the decision. Incentives toward optimal resolution timing 
would encourage examiners to be forthcoming with information 
important for the decision and to make unbiased recommendations 
to higher-level regulators. These inputs are crucial for improving 
resolution timing.  
 
1. Why a Special Takeover Bonus? 
The takeover decision requires special treatment for a num-
ber of reasons. First, it is the most difficult and drastic decision the 
regulator must make in her supervision of the bank. The regulator 
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has a number of reasons for being reluctant to pull the plug on a 
failing bank.129 Regulatory capture and the Stockholm effect may 
dissuade the regulator from taking over the bank. Pulling the plug 
might also highlight the regulator’s past mistakes in not interven-
ing more forcefully. At any given point, the regulator might prefer 
to wait and see, hoping the bank will turn itself around. As the Fi-
nancial Crisis illustrates—like all others before it—regulators tend 
to err on the side of taking over too late rather than too early. This 
delay in the Crisis exacerbated banks’ losses and the ultimate costs 
to the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF). A resolution bonus would 
offer a direct incentive to make the right timing decision at a criti-
cal juncture.  
Moreover, although the FDIC is charged by statute with the 
specific goal of minimizing DIF losses in its dealings with troubled 
banks,130 the FDIC is typically not involved in the takeover deci-
sion, which rests with each bank’s chartering agency or primary 
federal regulator.131 The FDIC takes over only after a bank has 
been declared insolvent and put into resolution. Because these 
other agencies do not have their own money at stake in the timing 
of the takeover, the incentives to wait and see may be overwhelm-
ing. 
 The bank debt-equity portfolio that we propose as part of 
the regulator’s compensation package may ameliorate this regula-
tory reluctance to some extent. The debt piece of the portfolio 
could induce the regulator to put the bank into resolution before it 
became massively insolvent, since continuing losses at the bank 
would eat into the value of the bank’s debt and the debt portion of 
the regulator’s incentive portfolio. On the other hand, it might be 
difficult for the regulator to assess the bank’s solvency in real time, 
since this involves an assessment of the bank’s asset values. With 
uncertainty, a wait-and-see approach might seem attractive to the 
regulator.132 The resolution bonus acts as a sort of consolation 
                                                
129 See supra Part III.C. 
130 See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(c)(4)(a). 
131 George G. Kaufman, FDIC Losses in Bank Failures: Has FDICIA Made 
a Difference?, ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 2004 (3Q), 13. 
132 Of course, if the debt-equity ratio is miscalibrated so as to be too equity 
rich, this will exacerbate this wait-and-see problem. If the potential gains to eq-
uity, which prefers additional risk during bad times, are greater than the poten-
(continued next page) 
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prize to the regulator, who might otherwise be tempted to let the 
bank try to work its way out of trouble to enable the regulator to 
recoup the losses suffered in her bank debt-equity portfolio from 
the bank’s demise.  
Another reason for a special resolution bonus is that market 
signals are likely to be noisy. Market discipline may not be useful 
in prodding a regulator to declare a bank insolvent because of in-
formation asymmetry. The optimal timing of the takeover decision 
will depend to a great extent on fine-grained private information 
which (a) is available only to the regulator, and (b) is constantly 
being updated in real time once takeover becomes a real possibil-
ity. A one-time bonus distinct from any market assessment of the 
decision is therefore advisable. 
 
2. Calculating the Bonus 
Because of the importance of minimizing DIF losses, the 
resolution bonus should be tied to the ultimate losses sustained by 
the DIF at the resolution of the FDIC’s receivership proceeding. 
Low losses should trigger high bonuses and vice-versa. In theory, 
then, if an examiner were to put a bank into resolution at time T1, 
and as a result FDIC losses were 100, the examiner would get a 
larger bonus than if the decision were made at T2 when the FDIC 
losses would be 200. Implementing this simple idea may not be 
straightforward, however. 
First, if we could discern the counterfactual losses that 
would have occurred at T2, then the calculation would be simple. 
But of course, a takeover at T1 makes it impossible to know the 
counterfactual T2 outcome. Second, it is entirely possible that a 
conscientious examiner might decide, given the information avail-
able to her at T1, to wait until T2 for more information. Important 
developments concerning the bank’s prospects—the direction of 
certain asset or lending markets, for example—might be worth 
waiting for. Perhaps paradoxically, the more uncertain are the 
                                                                                                         
tial debt losses, then this could induce the exact wrong behavior in regulators. 
Weighting the incentive mix heavily with debt and having long holding periods 
should help reduce this problem. 
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bank’s prospects, the more value there is in waiting.133 Third, even 
if a regulator made an (ex ante) optimally timed decision to resolve 
a failed bank, disposing of the bank’s assets may take several 
years. That process will affect the ultimate DIF loss figures and 
will not be under the examiner’s control.134 So a "final" resolution 
will be hard to predict at the time of takeover. 
Despite these seeming hurdles, a resolution bonus may still 
offer important motivation for a regulator to act promptly in put-
ting a bank into resolution, as compared to the current compensa-
tion system. The timing of takeover will no doubt have an impor-
tant effect on the severity of DIF losses, and warning signs in 
terms of bank characteristics and practices that lead to large resolu-
tion losses are not so mysterious. Researchers have identified fac-
                                                
133 The takeover decision involves a set of real options concerning the dis-
position of the distressed bank’s assets, including an option to forbear and see if 
the bank can work its way out of trouble. The value of the wait-and-see option at 
T1 increases with the variance of the bank’s future earnings, as well as its pre-
dicted growth. Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision 
Making, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 356, 361 (2001). As compared with firms in 
unregulated industries, however, the wait-and-see option for a failing bank may 
be less valuable because banking regulators do not suffer the same information 
asymmetry as bankruptcy judges or other outside decision makers. With a 
wealth of private information about the quality of the bank’s assets and man-
agement, banking regulators do not face the same degree of uncertainty about 
the bank’s future prospects as do actors tasked with deciding whether to pull the 
plug in other contexts.  
134 For example, the OCC makes shutdown decisions for the national banks 
it supervises, but the FDIC is required to be appointed as the receiver for every 
insured national bank. The FDIC sets the structure of auctions for bank assets, as 
well as deciding on the timing of sales. It may also enter into profit- or loss shar-
ing arrangements with asset acquirers in order to improve the terms of the sale. 
Marissa Fajt, FDIC Finds Fresh Ways to Minimize DIF’s Losses, AM. BANKER, 
Dec. 28, 2009. The OCC has enforcement authority under 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b) 
(to make orders and formal written agreements); 12 U.S.C. § 3907 (to issue 
capital directives); 12 U.S.C. § 1831o (to take Prompt Corrective Action 
(PCA)); and 12 U.S.C. § 1831p-1 (to issue safety and soundness orders). See 
OCC Policies & Procedures Manual, PPM 5310-3 (REV), July 30, 2001, avail-
able at www.occ.gov/static/publications/ppm-5310-3.pdf. For a discussion of 
new resolution authority rules for large banks and non-bank financial compa-
nies, see Brady Dennis, “FDIC’s new tools to close troubled banks offer oppor-
tunity, challenge,” WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2011, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2011/01/17/AR2011011704164.html.  
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tors that correlate with increased losses, as well as estimating the 
economic magnitudes of the effects. The findings generally com-
port with common intuition. Bank asset composition and quality 
affect ultimate losses,135 as does liability structure.136 For example, 
brokered deposits are positively associated with high-cost bank 
failures and shorter time to failure.137 The same is true for real es-
tate owned and loans past due.138 Uncollected income correlates 
with high-cost failures.139  
Local economic conditions also matter. State personal in-
come growth and the health of the local banking industry are nega-
tively correlated with FDIC losses,140 while in-state bankruptcy 
                                                
135 James R. Barth, Philip F. Bartholomew, & Michael G. Bradley, Deter-
minants of Thrift Institution Resolution Costs, 45 J. FIN. 731 (1990); JF Bovenzi 
& AJ Murton, Resolution Costs of Bank Failures, 1 FDIC BANK. REV. 1 (1988); 
Christopher James, The Losses Realized in Bank Failures, 46 J. FIN. 1223 
(1991).   
136 George G. Pennacchi, Risk-based Capital Standards, Deposit Insurance, 
and Procyclicality, 14 J. FIN. INTERMED. 432 (2005); Klaus Schaeck,  Bank Li-
ability Structure, FDIC Loss, and Time to Failure: A Quantile Regression Ap-
proach, 33 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 163 (2008). 
137 Schaeck, supra note 136, at 173 (measuring the ratio of brokered depos-
its to total assets). Brokered deposits are large sums aggregated by brokers on 
behalf of investors looking to earn higher than average returns on their FDIC-
insured deposits. Banks seeking to lure these large deposits must offer unusually 
high interest rates. The banks willing to chase these large deposits are often 
those in financial trouble, seeking to increase their deposits in a hurry in order to 
grow their way out of trouble. Id. But of course, in order to profit from these 
more expensive deposits, the bank must make riskier bets with them. See Eric 
Lipton & Andrew Martin, For Banks, Wads of Cash and Loads of Trouble, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jul. 4, 2009 (describing bank’s use of “hot money”—brokered depos-
its—to fuel risky growth). 
138 Schaeck, supra note 136, at 172, 177. Real estate owned typically in-
creases with loan defaults, as banks foreclose on real property collateral. Simi-
larly, loans past due of course increase with borrower defaults. 
139 James, supra note 135, at 1231; Kathleen McDill, Resolution Costs and 
the Business Cycle, FDIC Working Paper 2004-01 18; Schaeck, supra note 136, 
at 172, 177. Uncollected income is a measure of “nonperforming” loans—loans 
for which the borrower is behind in its payments. James, supra note 135, at 
1229. 
140 McDill, supra note 139, at 19. Since healthy banks in the vicinity of a 
failed bank are the likeliest purchasers of the failed bank’s assets, a weak bank-
ing industry translates into fewer and lower bids for those assets. Id.; Schaeck, 
supra note 136, at 174. 
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growth and the unemployment rate are positively correlated with 
FDIC losses.141 
The depth of existing research strongly suggests that a reso-
lution bonus algorithm could be constructed to both guide and 
cabin regulators’ discretion as to the timing of a bank takeover. 
Some trial and error would be involved in optimizing the bonus 
structure in pursuit of minimizing DIF losses, but with learning 
and experience, it might be possible to design a fully automated 
system in which market and other data are incorporated into the 
bonus algorithm.142 
Short of that, agencies can develop a mechanism for esti-
mating what losses would have been had the examiner not acted 
when she did. For example, post-mortem reports, like those de-
scribed above, could be helpful. The inspector general of the FDIC 
could estimate losses at hypothetical future intervals had the exam-
iner not taken over the bank when she did. These reports could de-
ploy a mix of economic models, learning from past failures, and 
expert opinions from inside and outside the regulatory agency.  
This approach is not perfect, of course; it suffers from po-
tential biases and manipulation. Most obviously, since the report is 
written only after the decision has been made to take over the 
bank, ex post biases may result in loss estimates that differ signifi-
cantly from what ex ante estimates would have shown. This could 
lead to distorted incentives for examiners making takeover deci-
sions. 
This problem is not fatal, however, so long as the potential 
biases are not predictable ex ante—that is, estimates are not sys-
tematically too high or too low. The use of external expert opinions 
to produce the loss schedules described above could reduce any 
bias. So long as the estimate is not expected to be biased one way 
or the other, examiners should be incentivized simply to do their 
                                                
141 McDill, supra note 139, at 21; Schaeck, supra note 136, at 174. 
142 Moreover, to ameliorate these conflicting incentives, and consistent with 
the end-game nature of the shutdown decision, at some point in the bank’s 
downward spiral, the value of the examiner’s debt-equity portfolio should be 
frozen for compensation purposes so that her only operating incentive is the 
shutdown bonus. With no additional portfolio upside to gain from a long-shot 
recovery by the bank, the examiner’s only focus will be on minimizing DIF 
losses from the bank’s failure. Of course, if the bank recovers and shutdown is 
avoided, the examiner’s portfolio should be unfrozen on the bank’s way up. 
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best—to time a takeover to minimize losses—since this is what 
they will expect the ex post estimator to be doing.143 Some ran-
domization among outside experts doing the ex-post analysis may 
help ensure the optimal ex ante incentives.144 
Even if predicting ultimate FDIC losses is not an exact sci-
ence for the regulator making the takeover decision, neither is the 
loss assessment inscrutable. A lack of research or analysis is un-
likely to be the reason why regulators have been too slow to pull 
the plug on failed banks. Empirical studies—many done by the 
FDIC—and post-mortem reports like those described earlier offer 
regulators a wealth of research to support the goal of minimizing 
DIF losses. Instead, regulators may simply need better incentives 
to get it right. 
 
3. Additional Considerations 
As to scale, the bonus should be potentially large enough to 
induce the regulator to forego her hopes of recovering significant 
value in her debt-equity portfolio from a miracle turnaround by the 
bank. Absolute values would depend on a comparison of the exam-
iner’s expected payouts under particular incentive contracts. If the 
examiner expects to receive $10 if the bank survives and becomes 
profitable, but the potential downside to the DIF has a positive ex-
pected value, then the examiner should be compensated more than 
$10 for a good takeover decision.145 
                                                
143 See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz and M. Todd Henderson, Prediction 
Markets for Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1343 (2007). 
144 See id. 
145 Although the shutdown bonus should offset the potential gains from a 
decision to forbear in favor of a possible turnaround, this does not necessarily 
mean that the bonus must be very large. When a bank is clearly distressed, the 
probability of turnaround will likely be very small. So even if potential gains to 
the examiner from a long-shot recovery would be large, the expected value of 
forbearance would still typically be small given the low probability of success. 
Multiplying the value from a successful turnaround by the probability of that 
turnaround will reduce the value of that strategy for the examiner. For example, 
if the examiner expects to earn $100 in the event that the bank recovers, but the 
probability of this is just 10%, then the shutdown bonus need be no greater than 
$10.  
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As the preceding discussion suggests, structuring takeover 
incentives will be tricky. It may be that they even overshoot: Ex-
aminers may be too aggressive in taking over banks that have a 
positive private and social value. One solution to this problem 
might involve a non-trivial penalty if the DIF ultimately suffers no 
losses after a bank is resolved because the examiner pulled the 
plug too soon. There should be a financial cost to this socially inef-
ficient decision.  
Of course, too long a gap between the takeover decision 
and the realization of the bonus, and the intercession of other ac-
tors in the asset disposition process, may vitiate the incentive effect 
of any bonus. Ultimate DIF losses and the related regulatory bonus 
will likely not be finally determined until some months or years 
after the bank is seized, and asset disposition decisions will be out 
of the examiner’s hands. Nevertheless, the takeover bonus may 
still offer important motivation for the regulator to act promptly in 
closing down a bank, as compared to the current system of com-
pensation. Though the timing of takeover will have an important 
effect on the final resolution and the amount of DIF losses, the 
regulator currently has every incentive to wait to see, as was amply 
demonstrated during the Financial Crisis. A well-structured bonus 
may help ameliorate this problem. 
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VI. QUALIFICATIONS AND OBJECTIONS 
In this Part, we raise and respond to some potential objec-
tions to our proposal. 
 
A. Strategic and Perverse Incentives 
Incentive structures may sometimes generate not only the 
desired outcomes but also some that are unintended and undesired. 
Our regulator incentive pay proposal is no exception. Time and 
experience will enable agency heads to identify and address any 
bad incentives that may arise from our proposal. In this section, we 
discuss a few of the possibilities for bad incentives that we can an-
ticipate. 
 
1. Crowding Out the Public Interest 
Some might object that incentive pay is fundamentally in-
consistent with public service. Financial rewards for “success” 
might change the public regarding culture within regulatory agen-
cies; financial incentives may crowd out the public spiritedness 
that would otherwise motivate employees. The possibility of finan-
cial rewards tied to market metrics might change regulators’ per-
ception of their charge. Instead of diligent altruistic service to the 
public, regulators and other agency employees might begin to view 
their roles in terms of market exchange. Regulators’ desiring 
higher compensation would pursue the proffered financial rewards, 
while those who value leisure might feel free to work less and 
forego the potential financial rewards for diligence. Once diligence 
has been priced, perhaps some regulators will slack.146 
In addition, the type of person that chooses to be a bank ex-
aminer could change. Regulators have employment choices, and 
                                                
146 See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1, 14 (2000) (describing an experiment where the use of financial incentives led 
to worse performance by experimental subjects); Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, Psy-
chological Foundations of Incentives, 46 EUR. ECON. REV. 687 (2002) (discuss-
ing interaction of economic incentives with intrinsic and social incentives). 
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we believe that regulators’ choice to be regulators derives at least 
in part from their interest in public service. This public spirit is an 
important regulatory asset and should be husbanded.  Public serv-
ice motives might be displaced by financial motivations among 
new hires after implementation of an incentive compensation 
scheme. Eventually, the composition of the regulatory agency 
could change for the worse. 
 We do not discount these concerns. Social scientists have 
documented the crowding-out effect in experimental settings. We 
do not believe, however, the effect is necessarily universal or suffi-
ciently well understood that experimentation with incentive com-
pensation for regulators should be precluded.147 Moreover, as de-
scribed above, the federal government has already begun experi-
menting with financial incentives for regulators. Enormous pay 
raises have been implemented at several executive agencies. Bank 
regulators have received bonuses for good performance during the 
crisis. These examples suggest that public spiritedness and finan-
cial reward are not mutually exclusive, at least up to a point. Our 
innovation is to rely on market pricing and specific observable out-
comes to set bonus pay, instead of relying on fiat. Ours is an in-
cremental step designed to link such bonus programs more explic-
itly to proxies for the social welfare function of regulators, to make 
incentive pay more transparent and less subject to political, class, 
racial or other biases, and to increase the sensitivity of such pro-
grams to performance.  
Given our incremental approach, any selection effects from 
variability of pay are likely to be minor, at least in the early stages. 
More generally, the possibility that increased pay variability might 
change the mix of individuals opting to serve as examiners could 
be a good thing. Examiners screened by their commitment to the 
public interest were in fact insufficiently attentive to that interest 
during the Financial Crisis.148 Accordingly, attracting individuals 
interested in a variable pay-for-social-performance compensation 
structure may be a beneficial change. 
                                                
147 It may be, for example, that economic incentives may substitute for so-
cial incentives, but that nominal economic incentives may be too weak. Cf. 
Gneezy & Rustichini, supra (finding that nominal economic rewards and penal-
ties led to worse performance).  
148 See supra Part III.C. 
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2. Insider Trading 
As with any incentive scheme involving publicly traded se-
curities, there is the possibility that security holders with access to 
non-public information will use that information to earn profits at 
the expense of those with access only to publicly available infor-
mation. Our proposal to use phantom securities with fixed redemp-
tion dates reduces this problem to a great extent, since examiners 
enjoy no discretion as to the grant or sale of their incentive securi-
ties. 
Given that examiner bonuses depend on positive market 
price movements, examiners may also be tempted at opportune 
moments simply to leak non-public information about the banks 
they oversee. While this is not an implausible scenario, examiners 
and other regulators already have incentive to misuse non-public 
information they obtain in the course of their work. For example, 
they may sell the information to traders. Or they may use accom-
plices to trade based on their private information. Work rules al-
ready restrict this misuse of information.  
On the other hand, our proposal does increase the likeli-
hood of misuse insofar as it confers upon regulators an economic 
interest in the market movements of certain bank securities that 
regulators might not have absent our proposal. To the extent our 
proposal increases the risk of insider trading or manipulation, 
agency heads may wish to augment prophylactic measures to de-
tect and deter these forms of misbehavior. To be sure, this is not a 
new problem for financial regulatory agencies. We are confident 
that appropriate measures exist to address this concern. 
 
B. Noisy Proxies 
A basic objection to our approach is that it simply won’t 
work. Our market-based incentives may be too blunt to be effec-
tive. Even after adjustments for relative performance,149 many im-
portant influences besides the regulator’s input will affect the mar-
ket pricing of the bank’s debt- and equity securities. Decisions by 
                                                
149 See supra Parts V.B.1, V.B.3. 
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the CEO and senior officers, for example, will generally dwarf the 
regulator’s influence over the bank’s performance and the market 
price of its securities. If the regulator’s decisions have little impact 
on the bank or the price of its securities, the argument goes, then 
our scheme will have weak if any incentive effects on regulators. 
Moreover, though private firms often extend option com-
pensation to rank and file employees, and not just executives, there 
is some debate as to whether broad-based option plans create effec-
tive performance incentives.150 No matter how much harder they 
work, individual employees are not likely to be able to exert much 
influence on firm value. Given their individual small shares in their 
firms, they might rather free ride than increase their effort.151  
These potential obstacles to performance pay schemes in 
private firms should not detain us, however. Our situation is differ-
ent. Regulators are not tasked with the general goal of increasing 
banks’ value. Their charge is far more specific, and their incentive 
structure is more targeted. Regulators’ charge is to guard against 
excessive bank risk taking, and our debt-heavy portfolio of phan-
tom bank securities focuses regulators on that task. In a well-run 
bank that does not incur excessive risk, it may be true—as with 
rank-and-file employees in private firms—that examiners’ ability 
to affect the value of the bank’s securities and their own debt-
heavy portfolios is weak or non-existent. But that is as it should be. 
The regulator will not object that a bank is not pushing the risk en-
                                                
150 Compare John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Stock Option Plans for Non-
Executive Employees, 61 J. FIN. ECON. 253 (2001) (finding results consistent 
with the use of options to offer performance incentives, as well as to attract and 
retain certain types of employees); Semi Kedia & Abon Mozumdar, Perform-
ance Impact of Employee Stock Options, Working Paper (2002) (same); with 
Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, Why do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Em-
ployees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 
99 (2005) (explaining broad-based option plans as mechanisms to sort employ-
ees and improve retention, but rejecting a performance-based incentives expla-
nation).  
151 Paul Oyer, Why Do Firms Use Incentives That Have No Incentive Ef-
fects?, 59 J. FIN. 1619, 1621 (2004) (noting the free rider problem among rank 
and file employees). See generally Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Produc-
tion, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777, 
786 (1972) (discussing free riding in the face of profit sharing when the produc-
tion team is large).  Firms may instead use broad-based option schemes to im-
prove retention and employee sorting. See supra note 150. 
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velope. Moreover, in that situation, the costs to the government of 
performance incentives are low, since the market value of the 
bank’s debt will probably not move much. The bank’s debt will 
enjoy a consistently low risk premium. 
However, in the opposite scenario, when a bank pushes the 
risk envelope and the market value of its debt declines, examiners 
have personal financial incentives to respond.152 This is the situa-
tion where performance incentives cause the regulator’s self-
interest to correspond with social welfare interests: Regulatory in-
tervention matters for social welfare and performance incentives 
matter for the regulator. So unlike the scenario of broad-based per-
formance incentives in private firms, regulators can anticipate the 
situation in which their intervention will matter a great deal. If that 
situation never comes to pass, all the better. 
Even in a private firm, though a given rank-and-file em-
ployee’s actions may not generally affect the value of the firm or 
the value of her options, there may be specific situations where her 
input is crucial, though it may be difficult to predict ex ante which 
specific contributions by which employees will later be impor-
tant.153 Similarly, with banks and regulators, it may be that, espe-
cially during good times, regulatory action has little effect on most 
banks’ value or the value of most banks’ securities. However, 
when a bank strays, prompt and effective regulatory action may be 
critical to avoiding large losses in the future. For this bank and this 
regulator, the incentives may matter.   
 
C. Why Not Just Improve Bank CEO Incentives? 
Given the existing learning on performance pay for execu-
tives, as well as post-Crisis proposals to modify bank CEO incen-
tive pay to address excessive risk taking, one might fairly wonder 
why incentive compensation should extend to regulators. Why not 
just tinker with bank CEO compensation structure, as one of us has 
suggested? 
                                                
152 The equity piece of the regulator’s portfolio guards against excessive 
risk aversion. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
153 Oyer & Schaefer, supra note 150, at 101 (noting that broad-based incen-
tive compensation might make sense where employees’ actions can have very 
large value implications for the firm).  
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By itself, adjustment of CEO incentive structures is un-
likely to offer a complete solution to excessive bank risk taking. 
There are good reasons to doubt that a CEO could be ideally incen-
tivized in such a way that regulatory effort would be unnecessary. 
Bank CEOs and regulators each have specialized functions. They 
play different roles, with different constituencies and different in-
formation sets. We could incentivize CEOs to act like regulators, 
but then there would be far less play for conventional corporate 
governance mechanisms to operate. The benefits of specialization 
would be lost. 
CEOs and regulators both suffer from bounded rationality, 
as well. So the conceptually optimal set of CEO incentives might 
either be too difficult to comprehend, or if simplified, might be 
more blunt than could be achieved with the specialist regulator in-
volved in affecting the CEO's behavior and the bank’s behavior. 
Similarly, attempting to craft optimal CEO incentives in order to 
obviate the need for the regulator would require Herculean exper-
tise on the part of the crafter of the incentive structure (presumably 
the regulator).  By placing the risk brake firmly in the regulator’s 
hands (instead of or in addition to the CEO’s), this enables adjust-
ments to bank risk policy no matter how the CEO’s incentives are 
structured. 
Moreover, regulator pay reform may offer more promise 
than banker pay reform. First, it is easier for government to change 
its own behavior and policies than to try to alter the pay practices 
of private enterprises.154 Resistance to the pay reforms proposed by 
the pay czar for a very limited number of TARP companies exem-
plifies the difficulties that banker pay reform proposals face. By 
contrast, we see no reason why the President or agency heads 
could not implement our proposal without much trouble. Of 
course, regulators would still have to cajole or coerce banks in or-
der to effect regulatory policy, as compared to internal governance 
incentives for bank CEOs. We view this as the more promising 
strategy, however, given the demonstrated political resistance to 
government tinkering with executive pay. 
                                                
154 See Tung, supra note 1, at __ (discussing implementation hurdles for 
banker pay reforms). 
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Second, as compared to regulators, bank CEOs might more 
easily be able to nullify their debt incentives by simply passing 
their debt risk to third parties.155 Monitoring and enforcement of 
bank CEOs’ portfolio requirements are likely to be weaker than 
similar constraints on regulators, who are already subject to con-
flict-of-interest rules,156 which could be adapted to prohibit hedg-
ing strategies that neutralize their incentive arrangements. 
 
D. Why Not Just Improve Examiners’ Incentives 
 within the Agency? 
 A natural reaction to our market-based approach might be 
to try less drastic, more incremental reforms first. The most obvi-
ous incremental reform would be to simply improve examiners’ 
internal incentive structures within their agencies. Or perhaps 
agencies could improve their organizational cultures to overcome 
the regulatory inertia we observed during the Crisis. We have read-
ily acknowledged the various moving parts to our market-based 
approach that would have to be ironed out over time with experi-
ence. Why undertake this wholesale change in examiner pay before 
less drastic measures had been tried? 
 Private firms of course use internal benchmarks to evaluate 
and reward employee performance, as well as market-based in-
struments like stock options. Internal benchmarking makes sense 
for private firms: Certain necessary “support” functions within pri-
vate firms—strategic planning or human resources or public rela-
tions, for example—do not contribute directly to the bottom line. 
External market-based measures may therefore offer poor indica-
tors for employees’ performance in these areas. 
 Despite this insulation from market indicators, however, we 
harbor some faith that private firms can construct suitable internal 
evaluation criteria for their employees. Poor internal benchmarks 
would hurt firms’ overall performance and profits, perhaps even 
leading to their demise. 
 With government agencies, of course, no similar market 
pressure exists to correct poor internal benchmarking. Though the 
                                                
155 For example, a put option on the CEO’s debt holdings would effectively 
enable the CEO to transfer the debt risk to the option writer. 
156 [cite]  
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Crisis focused more intense Congressional and public attention on 
bank regulatory agencies’ performance, the agencies continue to 
exist in the wake of the Crisis and examiners continue in their posi-
tions.  We are not aware of any examiner or high-level regulator 
losing her job as a result of poor performance in the Crisis. The 
Office of Thrift Supervision was nominally eliminated under 
Dodd-Frank: It was forced to merge into the OCC after having pre-
sided over the massive failures of IndyMac Bank, AIG, and Wash-
ington Mutual.  Even there, the legislation goes to great lengths to 
assure that no OTS employees will actually lose their jobs or suffer 
a pay cut!157 Each former OTS employee must enjoy the “same 
status and tenure” in her new job as the old.158 We are therefore 
skeptical that rearranging internal performance metrics could offer 
a complete solution to the incentive problems we have identified.  
Moreover, our market-based approach can offer real time 
incentives to regulators that internal benchmarks cannot. Market  
metrics are likely to impound the effects of regulatory action ex-
actly when that action matters most. For ordinary banking opera-
tions in normal times, a bank examination is unlikely to disturb the 
bank’s existing business model or affect the market pricing of its 
public securities very much. However, with a troubled bank, inves-
tors will keep a close watch over the regulatory actions to which 
the bank is subjected, and the nature and effect of these actions 
will be reflected in the bank’s securities prices.  
 
E. Increased Compensation Costs 
Some might worry that market-based pay will potentially 
increase the costs of compensating regulators. In boom years, for 
example, the value of some examiners’ phantom bank debt and 
                                                
157 [Dodd-Frank cite?] Robert Schmidt & Phil Mattingly, A Thrift Regula-
tor Fades (Sort of) into the Sunset, BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 14, 2010, available at: 
http://www.businessweek.com/print/magazine/content/10_43/b4200038824455.
htm. This elimination of an agency is, of course, quite rare. The demise of OTS 
was not solely a result of its failings in the Financial Crisis. From its inception in 
1989, many questioned the adviseability of a separate regulator for thrifts, and 
calls for its merger into the OCC or FDIC have been around as long as the 
agency itself.   
158 Cheyenne Hopkins, OTS-OCC Merger Off to Ugly Start, 10/12/10 AM. 
BANKER 1. 
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equity portfolios might balloon in value, independent of examiner 
performance. While this is certainly a possibility, the government 
can easily hedge against this risk. Most obviously, the government 
could hold debt and equity positions in banks that exactly match 
the phantom securities held by examiners, dollar for dollar. In this 
way, if the examiner’s pay were to rise by $100 as a result of an 
increase in a bank’s value, the government’s position would also 
rise by $100, resulting in no effective increase in compensation 
costs.  
One may object to the government taking ownership stakes 
in banks, but this objection is not difficult to overcome. For one, 
the government could take non-voting stakes or contract away its 
voting interest in any shares. Moreover, given the relatively small 
amounts of compensation involved, the government stakes would 
be miniscule. Any ownership influence the government might have 
would pale in comparison with the other avenues by which it influ-
ences banks. 
 Derivatives and other synthetic instruments could address 
this problem as well by simply replicating expected payouts under 
our compensation scheme. Such instruments would not be difficult 
to create and would avoid any government ownership stake in any 
bank. For instance, the government could buy call options on bank 
stocks and debt securities. Because such a call option locks in the 
price at which the government may purchase a bank’s stock or debt 
in the future, this approach completely hedges the government’s 
exposure to future appreciation in the bank’s securities.159 Impor-
tantly, options do not confer control rights or other complications 
of government involvement with private firms.160  
 
                                                
159 A call option entitles the holder to buy a specified security at a predeter-
mined price—the “strike price”—for a specified period. Assuming the govern-
ment purchases at-the-money call options with the same duration as the phantom 
securities used for examiner compensation, the government’s hedging expense 
would be limited to the initial cost of the options.  
160 The government could also purchase swap contracts to mimic the requi-
site cash flows from phantom stock and debt appreciation. 
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F. Incentivizing the Right People 
A final potential objection is that our focus on bank exam-
iners may be incomplete because examiners constitute only one 
link in the supervisory chain of command. There may be some-
thing to this objection. After all, private firms deploy incentive 
compensation not just for the CEO, but for decision makers at 
many levels in the hierarchy.   
In the context of bank regulation, our proposal focuses on 
examiners, but individuals both higher and lower in the hierarchy 
may also play important roles in bank supervision. Their perform-
ance might also improve with incentive pay. Line examiners pro-
vide crucial inputs into large and complex examinations, while 
higher-ups—an Assistant Deputy Comptroller or Deputy Comp-
troller for Large Bank Supervision, for example161—may have ul-
timate decision making authority on how to implement examiners’ 
conclusions.162 The incentive mechanisms we describe could be 
used for all of these individuals, though additional considerations 
must be addressed before deploying these mechanisms for higher-
ups.  
Higher-level bank regulators typically have oversight re-
sponsibilities for multiple banks. While incentivizing these regula-
tors with public debt and equity securities of the multiple banks 
they regulate might create useful incentives, possibilities for stra-
tegic behavior abound. A regulator holding a portfolio of banks’ 
securities may be incentivized to maximize the overall value of her 
portfolio, instead of improving the value of each bank. She might 
decide, for example, to focus all her attention on the bank in her 
portfolio that she believes holds the highest potential for apprecia-
tion. Or more perversely, she might even sacrifice the value of one 
bank for a larger increase in the value of another bank in her port-
folio.  
Incentive pay could be structured to discourage this kind of 
opportunism. For instance, a higher-level regulator’s portfolio of 
                                                
161 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  
162 Incentives might also be appropriate for FDIC officials responsible for 
resolving failed institutions, since their actions also have important conse-
quences for the severity of government losses from bank failures. See supra note 
XX and accompanying text. 
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phantom securities of multiple banks might be more debt-heavy 
than the portfolio of an examiner responsible for only one bank. 
This debt emphasis would magnify the effect of losses on the regu-
lator’s incentive pay, which would encourage her diligent monitor-
ing of all the banks under her supervision and discourage her from 
attempting to pick favorites from among the banks. More sophisti-
cated indexing approaches could also be devised.  
Agency heads are likely best positioned to identify the em-
ployees for whom incentive compensation holds the most promise. 
In general, the potential benefits of performance pay would seem 
greatest for individuals with wide discretion and important deci-
sion making authority in the supervision process. Our review of 
bank failure reports and banking supervision handbooks leads us to 
identify examiners as promising candidates. We leave it to agency 
heads to work out over time whether our pay-for-performance ap-
proach should be expanded up and down the hierarchy. 
Differential eligibility for incentive pay within an organiza-
tional hierarchy may create unintended side effects in terms of 
promotion and career progression. For example, examiners who 
receive bonuses might not be interested in promotion to higher-
level jobs where incentive compensation is lower or non-existent. 
While this is an issue to manage, it is not uncommon. As noted 
above, firms often pay sales people with high-powered incentive 
compensation that creates similar problems. Similarly, securities 
and commodities traders typically enjoy high-powered incentive 
pay that their supervisors do not. Even hourly workers may hesi-
tate to accept promotion to salaried supervisory positions, since 
accepting the salaried job often forsakes overtime pay. Among 
regulators, one would expect some efficient sorting, with regula-
tors with different skills sorting into positions based on their pref-
erences and comparative advantages.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
There is no reason we can think of why regulators are not 
paid for performance. The crucial issues are whether one can iden-
tify what “good” and “bad” performance are, whether contracts can 
be written ex ante that operationalize these metrics, and whether 
the potential negative effects from introducing a pay-for-
performance culture for regulators outweigh the potential effi-
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ciency gains. We have argued that bank regulation is an area where 
there are readily available metrics, where plausible contracts or 
payment schedules could be devised, and where the potential for 
crowd out or other downsides from incentive pay are limited.  
Accordingly, we propose that bank examiners be paid in 
part with a mix of debt-heavy incentives linked to bank equity and 
debt values. This pay should represent a substantial but not domi-
nant part of examiner pay, should be paid out over a number of 
years, and should adjust in order to maintain incentives aligned 
with the regulatory mission of ensuring that bank risk taking is 
aligned with the social welfare.  
Although seemingly radical, our proposal is consistent with 
recent moves by regulators to pay bonuses for good work and to 
generally increase the quality and efficiency of regulation. It is also 
consistent with laws and academic proposals to alter bank CEO 
pay to take greater account of the social component of bank losses. 
Our contribution is to merely point out that regulator incentives are 
an overlooked but crucial factor affecting bank risk taking, and that 
improving the social performance of banks and the banking system 
requires a consideration of the incentives not only of bank CEOs 
but also of bank regulators. Insofar as we can improve the effi-
ciency of government regulators, we need to worry less about the 
structure of private incentives, which are further from the control 
of government. 
 
